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ABSTRACT 
 
The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the 
possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in 
South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a 
huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different 
law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, 
namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the 
Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed 
about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence 
from the Centre.  
 
The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of 
crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, 
fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the 
majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and 
investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence 
Centre and its functions.  
 
This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as 
a crime intelligence source. 
 
KEY TERMS: 
Financial Intelligence Centre; Money Laundering; Financial Action Task Force; 
Investigation of Crime; Forensic Investigation; Intelligence Cycle; Financial 
Investigation; Financial Crime; Suspicious Transaction Reports;  Financial  
Intelligence Units.
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 Introduction 
According to Madinger (2006:293), one of the challenges of our time for criminal 
investigators is heightened awareness of the different sources of information and 
knowing what is available from these sources. Madinger (2006:293) further 
explains that the job of an investigator is not to know it all, but to be able to find 
information when it is required and to know where to search for it. According to 
Madinger (2006:296), the United States Treasury Department‟s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) exists to collect and disseminate information 
about money laundering and other financial crimes. FinCEN was commissioned to 
provide intelligence via analytical assistance to federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies nationwide, and certain federal regulatory authorities. 
FinCEN provides this assistance by using law enforcement and financial databases 
that are made available to FinCEN through Memoranda of Understanding, and via 
purchasing commercial database services under Service Level Agreements. The 
focus of the analytical assistance that is given to law enforcement agencies and 
authorities is on narcotics, money laundering, financial crimes and information on 
alleged violators of a wide spectrum of other crimes. Information obtained from 
commercial databases and the federal database can be disseminated without any 
further clearance. Information obtained from law enforcement databases has to be 
cleared, prior to its dissemination, with the agency that preserves the relevant 
database (Madinger, 2006:296).  
The researcher is able to confirm, based on employment at the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (hereinafter referred to as “the Centre”), that the Financial 
Intelligence Centre is the South African equivalent of the United States Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The Centre has been established in terms 
of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act no. 38 of 2001), and the official 
receipt of Suspicious Transaction Reports started on 3 February 2003. The 
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researcher undertook this study in an attempt to establish the levels of knowledge 
and understanding about the existence of the Centre as well as the capabilities of the 
Centre among investigators from various law enforcement agencies, namely, the 
South African Police Service, South African Revenue Service, and Intelligence 
Services in South Africa. Although the researcher could not identify any existing 
South African literature addressing the Centre as a source of intelligence, the 
available literature that was consulted, contained brief references to the role of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (Botes, 2005:61).  
The researcher is currently employed as a team leader at the Centre, and previously 
worked as a Captain in the South African Police Service for 11 years (1991-2002) 
before joining the South African Revenue Service (SARS) as a Senior Field 
Research and Analysis Officer in December 2002. SARS seconded the researcher to 
the Financial Intelligence Centre upon its establishment in 2003. The researcher 
was one of a group of five analysts who started the Monitoring and Analysis 
Department of the Centre. During the performance of duties and interaction with 
law enforcement agencies, the researcher identified the need for an increased 
number of awareness sessions that could cover topics such as the reasons for the 
existence of the Centre as well as the capabilities of the Centre. The researcher 
identified the following practical problems:  
 Investigators are not always aware of the types of intelligence that the 
Centre can provide them with; furthermore, many investigators do not know 
how to obtain this intelligence from the Centre, namely, that only 
authorised officers may request information from the Centre on their behalf. 
 The Centre has received relatively low volumes of requests from law 
enforcement agencies (refer to Chapter 3, which reflects these numbers), 
which might indicate a lack of awareness among investigators about the 
existence of the Centre, and what they could obtain from the Centre. 
 Madinger (2006) compiled an international guide, which, in the opinion of 
the researcher, is an excellent example of what could be compiled for the 
South African audience. A similar, comprehensive handbook for 
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investigators containing information about financial investigations in 
general, as well as details about the existence and capabilities of the Centre, 
could proof to be valuable to investigators, especially those who investigate 
financial-type crimes.  
As these practical problems became more prevalent in the day-to-day functions of 
the Centre, the researcher  identified that the need for research into the existence of 
these problems became crucial, so as to prove that these identified problems do 
indeed exist and require recommendations regarding ways to address these 
problems. The following research aims indicate what the researcher endeavoured to 
achieve with this research study. 
1.2 Research aims 
According to Mouton (1996:103) and Fouchè (2002:107), the aims of research 
studies are to establish the “facts”, to gather new data, and to determine whether 
there are interesting patterns in the existing data. The researcher identified the 
following as the aims for this research:  
 To determine what financial investigations entail. 
 To determine what the Financial Intelligence Centre is. 
 To provide guidance to investigators, wanting to make use of the  
            Centre, about the types of services that are available and the 
 procedures to follow to obtain intelligence from the Centre.  
 To make recommendations on the basis of the findings of this  
 research, which might be useful to South African investigators. 
 
1.3        Research purpose 
 
According to Murray (2002:260), the purpose of the research must be clear to the 
reader at first glance. Denscombe (2002:26-27) further explains that research can 
serve a multitude of purposes, which include, but is not limited to the following: 
describing problems, explaining things, evaluating or improving existing 
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procedures and empowering those taking part in the research project. In this study, 
the researcher described the practical problems that the Centre currently experience 
resulting from a possible lack of awareness among investigators: firstly, about the 
existence of the Centre and, secondly, about the types of intelligence products 
(which only authorised officers can request on behalf of the investigating officers) 
that are available from the Centre. The main purpose of this research was to explain 
the current level of awareness among investigators about the Centre and its 
mandate. The researcher will also attempt to formulate recommendations that could 
possibly assist to improve awareness among investigators about the existence of the 
Centre and its mandate.  
 
1.4       Research questions 
According to Denscombe (2002:31) and Mouton (1996:53), research questions 
should specify exactly what needs to be investigated, and it should be formulated to 
focus on the research problem that has been identified. The researcher formulated 
the following research questions:  
 What do financial investigations entail? 
 What is the Financial Intelligence Centre? 
 How can intelligence be obtained from the Centre? 
 
1.5 Key theoretical concepts 
 
The purpose of defining key concepts is the prevention of any misunderstanding 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:119). The following definitions will apply for the purposes 
of this study: 
 
1.5.1    Money laundering 
 
The researcher has combined the definitions of “money laundering” according to 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001) (FICA), Gup (2007:3), 
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Zwick (2003:36) and Blair and Brent (2008:161) to form the following wide-
ranging definition: Money laundering is an activity that has, or is likely to have the 
effect of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or 
movement of the proceeds of unlawful activities, or the conversion of the monetary 
proceeds of criminal activity, into funds with an apparently legal source without 
revealing the true nature, source, or ownership of those proceeds. In other words, it 
is the process of transforming illegally obtained funds into apparently legitimate 
income.   
 
1.5.2       Request 
 
An official definition for the term “request”, as applicable to the Centre, is not 
available. Therefore, the following description has been quoted from the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001): “A request is an official written 
document in terms of Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 
of 2001), submitted on a prescribed template to the Centre and signed off by an 
authorised officer”.  
 
1.5.3       Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) 
 
Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) refers to a suspicious or unusual transaction 
report, submitted in terms of Section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
(Act 38 of 2001). These reports contain certain prescribed information, namely, 
details of the suspicion; reasons for the suspicion; date and time plus the amount of 
the suspicious transaction reported; and details of the accounts and persons and/or 
entities involved. International literature commonly refers to these reports as 
suspicious activity reports (Richards, 1999:142; Madinger, 2006:488 and Blair & 
Brent, 2008:21). 
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1.5.4       Accountable institution 
There is no official definition for the term “accountable institution”; however, an 
accountable institution can be defined as a person or entity referred to in Schedule 1 
of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). This schedule refers to 
19 categories of persons or legal entities that have a reporting obligation in terms of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), and includes institutions 
such as banks, casinos, estate agencies and money remittances. 
1.6    Research design and approach 
According to Mouton (2001:55), the research design is a plan of how the researcher 
intends to conduct the research. An empirical design has been applied in this 
research, because it aspires to produce knowledge that is based on experience or 
observations made by the participants in their day-to-day work (Maxfield & Babbie, 
1995:4). The researcher has furthermore made use of interviews and the analysis of 
secondary data sources as described by Welman and Kruger (2002:57). The 
researcher also went into the field to obtain significant information from 
experienced members, as described by Denscombe (2002:6). 
 
According to Mouton (2001:150) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005:133), the focus of 
the qualitative approach is on phenomena that occur in their natural setting, which 
involve the study of phenomena in all its complexity, leading to an in-depth insight 
into the topic being researched. The qualitative research approach further enabled 
the researcher to obtain first-hand information during the semi-structured individual 
interviews with the participants, representing both the SAPS and SARS. The 
interviews were preceded by a broad literature study that included the reading of 
books and articles obtained from the Unisa Library as well as the internet.  
 
Creswell (1998:15) further alludes to the fact that a qualitative approach is multi-
method in focus, thus it would better assist the researcher to arrive at the best 
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results. In this study, interviews formed the basis of primary data sources and the 
literature study provided the secondary data.  
1.7    Target population and sampling 
According to Welman and Kruger (2002:18) and Maxfield and Babbie (2005:186), 
the population encapsulates the entire collection of units that the researcher would 
like to draw conclusions about. In this research, the ideal population under scrutiny 
would have included all the criminal investigators in South Africa who are 
employed by the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the State Security Agency 
(SSA) – formerly known as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the South 
African Secret Service (SASS). However, due to time, cost and security constraints, 
it was impossible for the researcher to get hold of the names of all the investigators 
and to consult this total population during the interviewing process of this research 
project.  The researcher, therefore, elected to make use of a study population as 
described by Maxfield and Babbie (1995:186), and decided to limit the study 
population to investigators from the two organisations with headquarters in 
Gauteng, as the researcher is based in Gauteng. The researcher selected a target 
population or sample, as explained by Denscombe (2002:11), which was 
representative of the total population. The researcher consulted the request registers 
of the Centre and found that, in the past, the South African Police Service and the 
South African Revenue Service were the two organisations that have submitted the 
most requests for information. The researcher was of the opinion that if a sample 
was selected from the two organisations that have submitted the most number of 
requests for information historically, these participants‟ views could be generalised 
and accepted as a satisfactory reflection of the opinions and understanding of most 
investigators in South Africa.  
 
The simple random sampling technique as described by Leedy and Ormrod 
(2001:199), as well as the snowball sampling technique as described by Lindlof and 
Taylor (2011:114) were chosen as the most appropriate methods to identify the 
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thirty (30) participants that were required for this research. The researcher required 
any fifteen (15) participants from each of the two identified institutions, namely, the 
SAPS and SARS.  
 
The sampling frame consisted of all the investigating officers and analysts from the 
identified units of the SAPS and SARS. The researcher requested the list of names 
of investigating officers and analysts from both organisations, but was only able to 
obtain a list of names from SARS. The researcher identified 76 investigating 
officers from the list of names that was obtained from the South African Revenue 
Service; these officers were all from the Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions 
Unit of SARS.  
 
The simple random sampling technique was used to select a sample of SARS 
participants for the purposes of this research. All the names of the SARS members 
were captured in an Excel spreadsheet. The names were numbered from 1 to 76, 
and the selection was done as follows: the numbers (1 to 76) were printed and 
placed in a hat, fifteen (15) random numbers were picked from the hat, and the 
corresponding names on the Excel spreadsheet were contacted to request 
interviews. Thereafter, five (5) additional names were selected; these five (5) names 
were kept as back-ups in the event of any of the selected participants not being able 
to take part in the interviews on the identified dates. The researcher wishes to state 
that none of the additional names were used, since all the originally selected 
members were available for the scheduled interviews.  
 
The South African Police Service did not provide the researcher with a list of 
names. In an effort to guard against any unnecessary delay in the completion of the 
research, the researcher decided to make use of the snowball sampling technique, as 
described by Lindlof and Taylor (2011:114), to select the sample of SAPS 
participants. The researcher was able to, from the database kept by the Centre, 
identify one (1) authorised officer. This officer, based at the Silverton offices of the 
Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI, division of SAPS), was willing 
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to serve the dual role of participant as well as guide to new participants that were 
members of the DPCI division of the SAPS, as well as a further two members from 
Crime Intelligence. This member, after being interviewed, also referred the 
researcher to investigating officers and analysts from the DPCI and the Crime 
Intelligence Division of the SAPS. Therefore, the final fifteen (15) members that 
were identified by means of the snowball sampling technique included thirteen (13) 
participants from the DPCI and two (2) participants from the Crime Intelligence 
Division of the SAPS.  
 
A total of thirty (30) participants were interviewed for the purposes of this study, 
with equal representation from both the SAPS and SARS, namely, fifteen (15) 
participants from each agency. 
1.8 Data collection 
According to Maxfield and Babbie (2005:209), the value of research is influenced 
by the methods that are applied in gathering data, the type of research, and the 
purpose of the research. Mouton (2001:99) explains that the data can be classified 
into various categories, namely, observation, interviews, archival or documentary 
sources, and physical sources. In order to reach the aspired research objectives, as 
set out earlier, the researcher decided that conducting a literature study, supported 
by thirty (30) interviews, would be the most appropriate method of gathering the 
required information.  
 
1.8.1 Literature study 
 
The research questions, aims and keywords such as Financial Intelligence Centre, 
money laundering and accountable institutions were contained in a request and 
submitted to the main Unisa Library to conduct a comprehensive literature search 
for all relevant information. The researcher applied the criteria as suggested by 
Mouton (2001:90) for a comprehensive literature review, which included local and 
international sources such as books, journals, newspapers and research 
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dissertations. The researcher also made use of Google scholar to obtain literature 
that covers criminal investigation methods and techniques in general, but 
specifically focuses on money laundering and financial investigations. Hard copies 
and/or the electronic internet format of journals from the International Association 
of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and all the relevant annual reports of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre were consulted to gain relevant and up-to-date 
information on this research topic (avoiding old and outdated information).  
 
Although none of the obtained literature contained the exact topic of this research 
study, the researcher could find a few documents referring to the Financial 
Intelligence Centre and/or money laundering aspects in South Africa.  
 
1.8.2 Interviews 
 
In this research, the semi-structured, face-to-face, individual interview technique 
has been utilised as described in Robson (2000:88) and Mouton (2001:105). This 
type of interview was also supported as an accepted data collection method by 
Schloss and Smith (1999:66) as well as Welman and Kruger (2002:166). The 
researcher developed a standard, semi-structured interview schedule with open-
ended questions, ensuring that all the participants were addressed with the same 
questions, and the questions were numbered and divided into four sections; this 
approach made the collected data more easily compatible as indicated by Robson 
(2000:91). Thirty (30) interviews with participants from the South African Police 
Service and South African Revenue Service, as identified earlier, were conducted.  
 
The researcher studied the guidelines for interviewing as described by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2001:159 and 2005:147) and applied these to the interviews. Some of the 
important things (as pointed out by these authors), which the researcher took into 
consideration, were objectivity, the protection of the privacy of the participants, the 
setting of the interviews, and making the participants feel at ease and comfortable 
with sharing their views without the fear that their identity would be disclosed. 
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Furthermore, the interviews were documented on individual interview schedules as 
printed for each participant. The interviews were conducted in private boardrooms 
at the participants‟ offices in order to ensure that their attention was not 
unnecessarily distracted or the interviews unduly interrupted.  The necessary 
permission was obtained from the SAPS and SARS to conduct interviews with the 
members that were selected as the participants, and the participants were also made 
aware of their rights to privacy and anonymity, prior to conducting the interviews.  
The participants were also informed that they had the right to withdraw from the 
interview at any time if they preferred to. The researcher kept in mind that the 
participants were giving their own interpretation of what they understood under 
each question and, therefore, tried at all times not to put words in their mouths by 
asking leading questions. 
 
The researcher tested the interview schedule on two FIC colleagues (not part of the 
sample), to ensure that all the interview questions were clear, understandable and 
unambiguous. The interview schedule was further perused by the Unisa co-
supervisor (Ms Marielize van Zyl) prior to conducting the interviews. As indicated 
earlier, the necessary permission to conduct the research was obtained prior to the 
interviews and the participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw 
from the interview process at any time if they did not feel comfortable to continue 
(refer to annexure B and annexure C: copies of the approval letters to conduct the 
interviews). 
 
A total of thirty (30) investigating officers and analysts [fifteen (15) from the South 
African Police Service and fifteen (15) from the South African Revenue Service] 
were interviewed on a face-to-face basis by making use of a semi-structured 
interview schedule containing closed and open ended questions. The participants 
were asked specific questions, based on the research questions and aims of the 
research, which were contained in the interview schedule. All the participants were 
asked the same closed and open-ended questions. The responses of the participants 
were written down on the individual interview schedules as printed for each 
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participant. The interviews with the South African Police Service members were 
conducted in the privacy of a meeting room located at the offices of the Directorate 
of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) in Silverton, Pretoria. The interviews with 
the South African Revenue Service members were conducted in the privacy of a 
meeting room located at the Riverwalk offices of the South African Revenue 
Service in Ashlea Gardens, Pretoria. The participants‟ anonymity was ensured and 
the interviews were not recorded by means of any electronic equipment.  
 
The participants were allocated numbers as means of identification in order to 
ensure the continuation of anonymity; numbers 1 to 15 were allocated to the South 
African Revenue Service participants and numbers 16 to 30 to the South African 
Police Service participants. Figures 1.1 to 1.3 (refer below) represent the 
demographics of the thirty (30) participants that took part in this research study. 
The researcher analysed the background information pertaining to the thirty (30) 
participants; the results are indicated below each figure.  
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Male
Female
 
Figure 1.1 Gender of the participants 
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Figure 1.1 above illustrates that the researcher found that thirteen (13) out of the 
thirty (30) participants were male and seventeen (17) participants were female, 
which equates to the following percentages: 57% Female and 43% Male. 
 
2
6
9
3
4
4
2
Age groups of the participants
23-27
28-32
33-37
38-42
43-47
48-54
55+
 
Figure 1.2 Age groups of the participants 
Figure 1.2 above illustrates the researcher‟s calculation that the majority (i.e., 73%) 
of the participants were older than 33 years of age. This percentage was calculated 
by adding together the number of participants from each of the age groups 
containing participants who were older than 33 years of age: nine (9) in the 33-37 
age category; three (3) in the 38-42 age category; four (4) in the 43-47 age 
category; four (4) in the 48-54 age category; and two (2) in the 55 years and older 
category. Therefore, a total of twenty-two (22) participants.  
 
The remaining participants (i.e., 27%) fell in the following categories: two (2) in the 
23-27 age category and six (6) in the 28-32 age category. There were no (0) 
participants in the 18-22 age category.  
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Years of experience in Law 
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Figure 1.3 Participants‟ years of experience in Law Enforcement 
 
It is clear, from Figure 1.3 above, that the majority (i.e., 73%) of participants had 
more than 7 years of Law Enforcement experience. This percentage was calculated 
by adding the participants from the following groups together: nine (9) that had 7 to 
10 years experience in Law Enforcement and thirteen (13) that had more than 11 
years experience; thus, a total of twenty-two (22) participants. The remaining 
participants (i.e., 27%) fell in the following categories: three (3) had between 4 and 
6 years experience and five (5) had between 1 and 5 years experience. 
 
Thirteen (13) of the participants indicated that they were, at the time of the 
interviews, employed as financial investigators or had previous experience in 
financial investigation and seventeen (17) indicated that they had no experience in 
financial investigation.  Out of the thirteen (13) participants who indicated that they 
were financial investigators, four (4) had less than 5 years‟ experience, three (3) had 
between five and ten years‟ experience and six (6) indicated that they had more than 
ten years‟ experience.  
Although none (0) of the participants have completed the Financial Investigators 
Course, presented by the Financial Intelligence Centre (in conjunction with the 
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Asset Forfeiture Unit), they have attended many other training courses, or have 
obtained tertiary qualifications in the financial investigation field. The courses that 
the participants mentioned as having completed, included the following: 
The following courses were mentioned among those that have been completed by 
the participant “Commercial Crime Course”, “Organised Crime Course”, “PFMA 
Course”, “Anti-Money Laundering Diploma (University of Johannesburg)”, “Anti-
Money Laundering Course (University of Pretoria)”, “Fraud Investigations 
Course”, “Internal SARS Investigation Course”, “POCA Workshop”, “B-Com 
Accounting Degree”, “Criminal Justice and Forensic Audit Course”, “LLB 
Degree”, “B-Com Degree”, “IT Accounting Course”, “Procurement Contract Fraud 
Course”, “Terrorist Finance Investigation Course” and “Fraud Examination 
Course”. 
The researcher observed that twenty-one (21) of the participants had current or 
previous analysis experience at the time of the interviews and nine (9) participants 
had no analysis experience. Eleven (11) of the twenty-one (21) participants (who 
indicated that they had analysis experience) had six or more years‟ experience. It is, 
therefore, clear that ten (10) participants had less than six years‟ experience in 
analysis work. 
1.8.3 Personal experience 
 
The researcher‟s career history was applied to analyse and evaluate the gathered 
data from a personal perspective; this career history includes 11 years of experience 
as an Analyst in the South African Police Service‟s Crime Intelligence Division, 
employment in the South African Revenue Service, and his position at the Centre at 
the time of the research. 
 
The researcher obtained a BA Police Science Degree from Unisa during 1995 and a 
honours BA Degree in Criminology from Unisa during 1998. Other tertiary 
qualifications include a diploma in Datametrics obtained from Unisa during 2001, a 
Certificate in Taxation obtained from the University of Pretoria during 2003 and a 
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Certificate in Money Laundering Control from the University of Johannesburg 
(previously known as RAU) during 2004.  In addition to the above, the researcher 
attended various internal as well as external training sessions during the course of 
employment in the South African Police Service and left the service during 2002, 
whilst holding the rank of Captain.     
1.9 Data analysis 
The researcher is of the opinion that the data analysis and interpretation in this 
research project has been combined with the data collection process as pointed out 
by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:150). This has been done in order to understand the 
variety of elements that were contained in the gathered data and to identify possible 
trends or patterns in the data as explained by Mouton (2001:108). Furthermore, 
Welman and Kruger (2002:195) and Maxfield and Babbie (2005:107) pointed out 
that content analysis by means of decoding is the most suitable technique for 
qualitative research. The researcher used raw data and applied the following steps 
of the data spiral as described by Leedy and Ormrod (2001:161) to ensure effective 
data analysis:  
 Analysis was conducted by organising the relevant publications and 
correspondence that were consulted in an arch lever file. The researcher also 
created a dedicated computer folder with subfolders for all the relevant 
documents that have been consulted during the research process, as well as 
information related to the interviews. The researcher also captured all the 
answers from the interview schedules, as written down by the researcher 
during the interviews, by typing it onto an Excel spreadsheet.  
 The researcher perused all the relevant information several times and made 
use of personal notes to extract the relevant data. 
 The researcher categorised the data by dividing it into smaller groups and 
possible themes, and created different tabs in the Excel spreadsheet to group 
information about each subsection together, for example, financial 
investigations and the Financial Intelligence Centre. 
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 Synthesis was reached by combining all the analysed data, together with 
supporting graphical representations, into one written report. 
 Deductions were made after studying all the gathered information (results of 
the interviews, literature and personal experience) and then applied to arrive 
at answers for the posed research questions.  
 
The data from the interviews and documentary sources were compared, analysed, 
and grouped together to draw a comparison between the different participants‟ 
versions.  The obtained data was compared with the obtained literature to determine 
the possible differences, trends and similarities. The combination of all the 
abovementioned approaches resulted in comprehensive and efficient analysis of the 
data; the acquired results were reported in the research document. 
 
1.10 Reliability 
 
Mouton & Marais (1992:81), Schloss and Smith (1999:93), as well as Maxfield and 
Babbie (2005:129) all indicated that reliability means that the acquired results must 
be measured in a consistent manner in order to ensure that the observations that 
were made by the researcher could be replicated should the same data collection 
methods be applied by another researcher.  The researcher ensured that all the 
participants were asked the same questions, as per the interview schedule. The 
researcher did not ask leading questions and applied the indirect method of ensuring 
reliability by following the steps regarding validity as described below. 
 
1.11  Validity 
 
Denscombe (2002:100) indicates that validity concerns the accuracy of the 
questions asked, the data collected and the explanations offered. The use of semi-
structured interview schedules ensured consistency throughout the interviews with 
regard to qualitative data collection.  The interview schedule was compiled by 
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using the research questions as headings and then arranging the relevant questions 
according to the sections of the interview schedule. 
 
The researcher, furthermore, ensured confidentiality by conducting the interviews 
in private. The researcher did not ask leading questions and endeavoured to ensure 
that the participants felt comfortable giving their honest opinions.  The participants 
had the opportunity to select where they wanted to sit in the selected boardroom, 
allowing them to concentrate and respond freely during the interview, and ensuring 
the least amount of interruptions during the time. The answers to the questions were 
comprehensively written down to ensure an accurate record of the interviews.  
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:100), the idea of validity can further be 
enhanced by words such as “verification”, “trustworthiness” or “credibility”. 
 
1.12  Ethical Considerations 
 
Post-graduate students are sensitised to adhere to ethical rules and principles during 
research (Mouton, 2001:238). The researcher, being aware of the importance of 
maintaining morally acceptable norms and values in scientific research, adhered 
thereto at all times. The researcher ensured the confidentiality of all the responses 
that were given by all the participants. Anonymity was guaranteed where requested, 
and the necessary consent was obtained before disclosing any information that was 
obtained during this research project. According to the Policy on Research Ethics of 
the University of South Africa, (Unisa, 2007:7), researchers should respect and 
protect the dignity, privacy and confidentiality of participants; the researcher 
adhered to these guidelines during the research. 
 
The following ethical matters, as emphasised by several authors (Madsen, 1992:79; 
Mouton, 2001:241; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005:101), were taken note of and adhered 
to while conducting this research:  
The researcher obtained “informed consent” from all the participants: voluntary 
participation was a prerequisite; participants were presented with enough 
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information about the research, enabling them to make informed decisions about 
their willingness to participate. 
 
The participants were “protected from harm”: the participants were not exposed to 
unnecessary stress or embarrassment; none of their answers were discussed with 
any of the other participants or anybody else. 
 
The researcher adhered to “honesty” towards professional colleagues: the 
researcher did not fabricate data to support any personal specific findings, ensured 
that all sources were acknowledged, and refrained from committing plagiarism. 
 
Every individual participant‟s “right to privacy”, as described by Mouton 
(2001:239), has been respected: the researcher did not disclose any response by any 
participant in a manner that exposed the specific participant. 
 
“Reference” was made to all sources incorporated in the research: all the consulted 
sources were included in the comprehensive list of references. 
 
1.13  Chapter Layout  
 
The chapters of this research have been separated according to the following break-
down, ensuring that the research aims and questions were all addressed, the 
research report was well-structured and a logical order was applied to the content: 
 
Chapter 2:  Financial Investigations  
 
In this chapter, the focus will be on financial investigations. The difference between 
criminal investigation and forensic investigation will be touched on to bring into 
context the nexus between criminal, financial and forensic investigations, as well as 
intelligence. This chapter will also provide the reader with an introduction to 
money laundering and asset tracking, freezing and forfeiture. These aspects form 
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part of the financial investigation techniques that are used by investigators, 
especially when the assistance of the Financial Intelligence Centre is requested.  
 
Chapter 3:  The Financial Intelligence Centre 
 
This chapter will mainly focus on providing an overview of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre. It will provide background information about the origin and 
establishment of the Centre, and refer to the international organisations, which had 
an influence on the establishment of the Centre. It will explain the mandate and 
mission and vision of the Centre, and lastly, reflect some of the strategic 
achievements as reported by the Centre in its annual reports. 
 
Chapter 4: Intelligence obtained from the Financial Intelligence Centre 
 
In this chapter, the researcher will provide an overview of the relevant sections of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). These sections deal with 
the obtaining of relevant intelligence from the various accountable institutions, as 
well as the freezing of accounts. This chapter will further explore the types of 
intelligence that a person could obtain from the Centre, and describe the different 
types of intelligence products that the Monitoring and Analysis Department of the 
Centre can provide, without disclosing any classified information, to the different 
law enforcement agencies.   
 
Chapter 5:  Findings and Recommendations 
 
This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of what has been discovered 
as a result of the research. Furthermore, it will relate to the aims and research 
questions on which the researcher based the findings and recommendations of this 
research. Any recommendations for further research will also be included in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Both Pasco (2009:1) and Zagaris (2010:6) are of the opinion that financial crime is 
hard to define by means of a single definition, because it involves crimes that are 
covered by different criminal and civil laws. The researcher shares this view and 
can add that a lot of investigators do not make a distinction between criminal and 
financial investigations. Pasco (2009:5) further states that financial crimes have 
existed as long as men have had financial dealings with each other. These crimes 
have been categorised separately from other crimes and criminal activity due to 
criminals using fraud and conspiracy to commit these crimes. 
 
The researcher also shares the opinion of Pasco (2009:5) that illegal financial 
schemes became more innovative and complex as the economy and standards of 
living expanded and developed. The important thing to remember is that financial 
crime is costing the economies of all countries billions in currency each year. 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that, in the modern era of policing, it has become 
important for the investigators to utilise innovative ways of obtaining intelligence 
about a suspect, as it could assist in the investigation of alleged contraventions. The 
researcher believes that the gathering of financial information about an individual 
may assist the investigator to create a paper trail of the transactions conducted by a 
suspect. This might lead the investigator to other individuals involved in the 
possible criminal activity. Therefore, the investigation of financial evidence may be 
of considerable help in trying to solve complicated financial crimes, especially 
when a large number of individual perpetrators are involved.  
 
The following aspects will be discussed in this chapter in order to emphasise the 
importance of financial investigation: white collar crime, a financial investigation, 
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the criminal investigation process, the use of intelligence, forensic investigation as a 
scientific approach to investigation, types of financial crimes, and asset tracking, 
freezing and forfeiture. This chapter will further focus on important aspects with 
regard to forensic investigations and the utilisation of intelligence during 
investigations of money laundering cases. It will introduce the reader to the work of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre, whilst the later chapters will address specific 
details regarding the work of the Centre and the types of intelligence products 
available. 
 
2.2 White Collar Crime 
 
Financial crime forms part of the broader classification of crimes, namely, white 
collar crime. White collar crime has first been explained by Edwin Sutherland in a 
speech to the American Sociological Society in 1939 as “what may be defined 
almost as crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the 
course of his occupation” (Pasco, 2009:2; Zagaris, 2010:1).  
  
Zagaris (2010:6), furthermore, points out that financial crime refers to diverse 
activities that cannot be included under a standardised category. The newness of the 
field, the overlap of criminal and statutory law, and differences among legal 
systems make an accurate definition elusive.  
 
Zagaris (2010:504) also reported that one dynamic of international white collar 
crime is that economic crime reacts to systemic economic changes that are caused 
by new combinations of productive factors such as the combination of banking and 
computers, which have led to internet banking and online gambling. These new 
developments have opened up new opportunities for criminals to gain access to 
people‟s money via, for example, “phishing scams”. The researcher further agrees 
with Zagaris (2010:504) that phishing is when a criminal attempts to acquire 
sensitive information such as passwords or credit card details through email or 
instant messaging by pretending to be a legitimate business representative. In South 
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Africa, according to the researcher‟s experience, the senders of these types of e-
mails pretend to send the e-mails from online services such as EasyPay, SARS 
eFiling, and also the Financial Intelligence Centre. 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you explain 
what white collar crime is?” The majority of the participants, twenty-seven (27) out 
of the thirty, either had some idea or gave the correct answer to the question. Three 
(3) participants did not answer the question, or indicated that they were not sure 
what it was. Six (6) of the twenty-seven (27) participants that did answer the 
question, provided answers that are similar to definitions obtained from literature. 
Twenty-one (21) participants had some idea what white collar crime is, mostly 
trying to explain the term by providing examples of crimes that they would classify 
as white collar crimes. The following were the answers provided by the participants 
(grouped together according to similarity); some participants did not provide any 
answer and others provided more than one answer (the amounts in brackets indicate 
the amount of answers/similar answers):  
 “It is a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status.” (3)  
 “It is crimes such as fraud, bribery, computer crime, money 
laundering, identity theft and forgery.” (12)  
 “Crimes involving high ranking people like the Commissioner of 
SARS.” (1) 
 “Where people use their intelligence to commit fraud and use their 
connections that work in government departments.” (1) 
 “Crimes committed by decent people, not thugs.” (1) 
 “Persons in specific positions have access to large sums of money 
which they then steal.” (1) 
 “It is crimes committed by people with knowledge of mathematics or 
accounting.” (6) 
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From the provided answers, as listed above, it is clear to the researcher that none of 
the participants are familiar with the textbook meaning of white collar crime, but 
that most of them have some idea what the term refers to, as they indicated that it 
relates to the type of person that conducts the crime.  
  
2.2.1  A Financial Investigation 
 
The researcher agrees with the following explanation by Van Duyne, Pheijffer, 
Kuijl, van Dijk and Bakker (2001:18) regarding financial investigations: “A 
Financial investigation is the collecting, controlling, complementing, processing 
and analysing of financial and/or related data on behalf of law enforcement”. In 
other words, it is sifting through financial information such as bank accounts in 
order to identify the flow of money and thereby assisting the investigators in 
identifying not only the possible perpetrators, but also the possible proceeds of 
crime. 
 
The researcher supports the opinion of Van Duyne et al. (2001:71) and also agrees 
with Ratcliffe (2008:136) that the core of financial investigation is an analytic and 
systematic approach to all aspects of criminal information, which is related to the 
financial aspects of crime. The nature and structure of a criminal grouping is 
determined by factors such as commodity, culture and the pressure of law 
enforcement; therefore, financial investigation is determined by the kind of criminal 
information resulting from the interaction between these factors.  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Is there, in your 
opinion, a difference between a Financial Investigation and a Criminal 
Investigation?” Those who answered “yes” were asked to explain the difference. 
Eighteen (18) of the thirty (30) participants indicated that there was a difference 
between criminal and financial investigations, and twelve (12) indicated that there 
was no difference. Some of the participants did not indicate any difference and 
others provided more than one difference. The following differences were 
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mentioned (the amounts in brackets indicate the amount of answers/similar 
answers): “Financial investigations follow the money trail and are much more 
focused on documents” (2), “It identifies the proceeds of crime” (3), and “It is 
difficult to detect because usually there are no witnesses” (1). Six (6) participants 
provided answers that pointed out that criminal investigations are performed to 
uncover information about a crime and to search for evidence. Three (3) 
participants explained the following differences: “Financial investigations focus on 
accounts and documents specifically and criminal investigations concentrate more 
on suspects, families and the crime itself”. 
  
The researcher deducted, from the answers provided, that a divided opinion exists 
about whether there is indeed a difference between a criminal and a financial 
investigation. Although eighteen (18) participants indicated that there is a 
difference, twelve (12) were of the opinion that the same investigation principles 
apply to both types of investigations. Those indicating a difference highlighted the 
fact that financial investigations focus more on documentation. The difference in 
opinion among the participants gave the researcher some indication that a lot of the 
participants apply normal investigative techniques towards complex financial 
investigations; this might be a possible reason why not all investigators make use of 
the intelligence that is available from the Financial Intelligence Centre.  
 
According to Pasco (2009:6), the gathering of documentary evidence plays an 
integral part in any financial investigation, since the bulk of evidence in most 
financial investigations consists of documentation. Pasco (2009:104) states that one 
way of describing the use of forensic accounting in a financial investigation is the 
compiling of all the financial transactions of a subject for consecutive time periods, 
and then comparing the results of the time periods in sequence to determine the 
income or loss the subject incurred during each period. A summary schedule is 
prepared to show the increase of wealth of the subject from period to period. All 
legal income for these periods is deducted and what is left will most likely be 
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income from an illegal source. The analysts of the Centre usually refer to this 
method as a lifestyle audit. 
 
The thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you explain what a financial 
investigation is?” Not all of the participants provided answers to this question; those 
providing answers, stated the following (the amounts in brackets indicate the 
amount of answers/similar answers): “When you look at finances of a person and 
compare it to his/her spending patterns” (6), “It is when you conduct a lifestyle 
analysis” (1), “It is usually document intensive and involves bank account details” 
(1), “The major goal is to identify and document the movement of money” (1), “It 
is the systematic search for the truth using accounting principles” (1).  
Seventeen (17) participants, in order to explain how they understood the term, 
provided examples of the types of crimes that are investigated when conducting a 
financial investigation; the following crimes were mentioned (the amounts in 
brackets indicate the amount of answers/similar answers): “Fraud” (11), “bribery” 
(3), “crimes committed by decent people not thugs” (2), “computer related 
crimes”(1). Three (3) participants did not give any answer, or indicated that they 
were not sure. The researcher can conclude from the above-mentioned answers that, 
although not all of the participants provided textbook answers, the majority had an 
idea what is meant by “a financial investigation”.  
 
2.3     The Criminal Investigation Process 
 
Criminologists will continue debating the theories on method (how), type (what), 
motive (why), and place (where) of crime. However, according to Pasco (2009:2), 
the two most commonly asked questions in the investigation of crime are definitely: 
“Who committed the crime?” and “What was the motive?” 
 
The researcher will explain the term “criminal investigations” by briefly presenting 
definitions by other authors such as Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) indicating 
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that the investigation of crime “is a scientific and systematic search for the truth 
with the purpose of solving the committed crime”.  
 
Gilbert (2004:64) mentions that the investigation process, in general, consists of the 
following three phases: 
 Preliminary investigation: reporting of the crime, crime scene 
management and the gathering of evidence from the crime scene. 
 In-depth investigation: comprehensive investigation of the matter by 
obtaining witness statements, forensic reports and identifying the 
suspects.  
 Final investigation: arrest of the perpetrator and submitting the 
comprehensive case docket to court for litigation purposes. 
 
Although the researcher agrees that an investigation usually consists of three 
phases, the first phase in the case of a financial crime investigation very often does 
not have a traditional crime scene. In the case of financial crimes, the scene that 
needs to be investigated usually refers to a fraudulent cheque or bank statements 
that form the basis of the investigation. The principal of gathering evidence in the 
first phase is also relevant, although the “crime scene” will be, for example, a 
cheque or bank statement. Furthermore, Bedi (2004:413) indicated that the way in 
which law enforcement works today, is to include financial investigations in general 
criminal investigations.  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you explain 
briefly what the three phases are which the investigation process consist of?” Six 
(6) of the participants indicated that the investigating process consists of the 
following phases: “Gather”, “Analyse”, “Dissemination”, “Planning or 
Investigation”, and “Prosecution”. Nineteen (19) participants were of the opinion 
that the following were phases in the investigation process: “Exploration”, 
“confirmation”, “development of understanding”, “first information of crime”, 
“gathering information”, “court proceedings”, “planning”, “execution”, and “court 
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process” (not all 19 provided the phases in this exact sequence, but the researcher 
grouped these 19 responses together because of commonality). Five (5) participants 
either did not give any answers, or indicated that they were not sure. The 
explanations that were provided by the participants might indicate that not all of the 
participants are familiar with the different phases of the investigation process. It 
might have a negative effect on an investigation if the investigator is not familiar 
with the important phases of the process and the sequence of events (what needs to 
happen when).  
 
Newburn, Williamson and Wright (2007:36) believe that investigative requirements 
do not stagnate; every age produces new targets, offers fresh techniques and 
demands different evidential standards.  
 
Since this research will focus on financial investigations, the researcher wants to 
draw the reader‟s attention to the five key elements of the investigation process 
concerning white collar crime, as summarised by Bintliff (1993:22) and supported 
by Pasco (2009:103), namely:  
 The investigation must have a specific intent and limited objectives; 
 The investigation should be tailored to the specific white collar 
crime, since each white collar crime has its own characteristics; 
 All relevant, documented evidence should be properly collected and 
handled; 
 The essential elements of proof should be established; and 
 Investigators should strive to proof the crime despite their goals. 
 
The researcher can state, by means of personal experience, that investigators utilise 
different investigation techniques, and that the main types can be divided into overt 
and covert techniques (Pasco, 2009:92-94).  Overt techniques refer to normal police 
methods that are used to gather evidence, such as obtaining witness statements or 
gathering physical evidence from a crime scene (Madinger, 2006:269) supported by 
Pasco (2009:23-24). 
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The researcher is of the opinion that when investigators make use of intelligence in 
their investigations, it could be classified as covert investigations as explained by 
Newburn et al.(2007:660) and Pasco (2009:92). According to Madinger (2006:269), 
the reason for classifying the use of intelligence in the investigation as a covert 
technique, is because the investigation is conducted without the suspect‟s 
knowledge about the on-going investigation. The researcher is of the opinion that 
obtaining financial intelligence from the Financial Intelligence Centre can be 
classified as a covert investigative technique, because the information that is 
gathered cannot be used as evidence, but only for intelligence purposes.  
 
For the benefit of the reader, the researcher will subsequently shed more light on 
the term “intelligence”, since it formed an essential part in the establishment of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre.  
 
2.4 The use of intelligence 
 
The researcher is of the opinion and, therefore, agrees that modern investigators 
have moved away from traditional investigation techniques to increasingly make 
use of intelligence in their investigations (Newburn et al., 2007:60; Pasco, 2009:1; 
Zagaris, 2010:1-2). 
 
To illustrate the importance of the use of intelligence, the thirty (30) participants 
were asked: “Please explain what the use of intelligence in a financial investigation 
is?” Twenty-two (22) of the participants provided a mixture of the following: 
“Information gathering” (13), “lifestyle analysis” (7), “background checks” (5), 
“profiling suspects” (3), and “identifies properties and companies where the 
suspects are involved in” (2). The other eight (8) participants gave no answer, or the 
wrong answer, for example, “that it is used for evidence”.  
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These answers provide a clear picture that the majority of the participants had a 
clear understanding of the use of intelligence in a financial investigation and that 
intelligence cannot be used as evidence.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that the Financial Intelligence Centre can play an 
integrate role in providing timely and accurate intelligence; therefore, assisting law 
enforcement agencies to adhere to the first principle of the CompStat model. 
CompStat is an innovation that provides a proactive means to ensure that law 
enforcement organisations are using thoughtfully developed crime analysis to plan 
their manner of crime prevention and investigation. It is a computerised system that 
keeps track of week-by-week crime figures for each precinct, and the weekly 
figures are being made available to the public within a week. In addition, “….the 
CompStat model provides law enforcement agencies with a way to restructure their 
management framework to improve resource allocation, strengthen partnerships 
with other government agencies, and improve services to citizens” (University of 
Maryland, 2011).  
 
2.4.1 Intelligence-led policing  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that intelligence-led policing can be defined in 
layman‟s terms as a model of policing where intelligence is used as a guide to 
operations (Maguire & John, 2006:67-84). Ratcliffe (2008:76) explains that the 
crime reduction mechanism of the Compstat model involves four principles, 
namely: timely and accurate intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment, and 
relentless follow-up and assessment.   
 
Various authors, including Sonne (2006:93) and Ratcliffe (2008:136) emphasised 
the following important aspects that need to be incorporated in intelligence-led 
policing efforts: forensic accounting and corporate investigation, and the ability to 
track financial transactions across multiple accounts in different jurisdictions. The 
investigator should also identify locations that are prone to narcotics related crimes.   
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2.4.1.1  The intelligence cycle 
 
The researcher shares the opinion of Swanson, Chamelin and Territo (2003:245), 
Newburn et al. (2007:204), and Ratcliffe (2008:105) explaining that the intelligence 
cycle is a repetitive cycle of stages that have been used effectively in both military 
and law enforcement circles. The researcher is of the opinion that it is important to 
explain the stages of the intelligence cycle, as the intelligence that can be obtained 
from the Centre can, at any point, be re-appreciated and re-introduced into the 
cycle, making it a never-ending process. The cycle will normally start with 
direction (or planning and collection), followed by the remaining stages, namely: 
collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that when the investigating officer submits a 
request for information to the Centre, it forms an integral part of the intelligence 
cycle, because the Centre may provide the investigating officer with new 
information that might assist them in tracking down the suspect/s that they are 
looking for. 
 
Figure 2.1 The intelligence cycle as provided by Ratcliffe (2008:105) 
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2.4.1.1.1  Direction or collection phase 
 
During the planning and direction or collection phase of the intelligence cycle, the 
needs of the clients or requestors are considered, and the collection requirements 
are adjusted to the needs of these clients (Swanson et al., 2003:245).  
 
All the possible sources of information need to be identified; the investigator needs 
to constantly think about new sources of useful information and not only traditional 
sources (Newburn et al., 2007:205). 
 
From personal experience, the researcher can state that the Centre takes the 
requirements of the different requestors into consideration before the Centre‟s 
analysts start preparing a response to a request for information and try, as far as 
possible, to extensively answer the questions posed by the requestors.  
 
The requestors are provided access to information that is held be the Centre in terms 
of Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). Law 
enforcement agencies, the South African Revenue Service or the Intelligence 
Services may be provided with information upon request or at the initiative of the 
Centre (De Koker 2007: Com 5-7). 
 
2.4.1.1.2  Evaluation and collation phase 
 
The gathered intelligence needs to be evaluated to establish if it will be of any value 
to the investigator. The investigator allocates a grading to the source and the 
intelligence obtained to indicate if the same source will be useful in future 
(Newburn et al., (2007:206). 
 
During the collation phase, the raw information needs to be gathered, managed and 
analysed in order to produce a final intelligence product (Ratcliffe, 2008:105; 
Newburn et al., 2007:206).  
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Investigations may utilise overt and/or covert collection methods (refer to paragraph 
2.3) and the intelligence obtained from the Centre could be classified as covert 
information, since the identity of the reporter of the information may not be 
disclosed; reporters are protected in terms of Section 38 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001).  
 
2.4.1.1.3  Analysis phase 
 
Analysts need to convert a vast amount of raw information, which they collect from 
both the SAPS and other relevant sources, in the process of turning raw information 
into useful intelligence (Swanson et al., 2003:245; Newburn et al., 2007:208). The 
researcher is of the opinion that analysis functions have become less complicated 
than in earlier years when analysts had to rely on physical files and indexing 
systems to make associations. The modern day analysts have access to software 
programmes such as Analyst‟s Notebook and iBase, which assist them in the 
analysis process.  
 
During the analysis process (forming part of the intelligence cycle), the analysts 
convert the basic gathered information into a final intelligence product. This is 
achieved through integrating, evaluating and analysing all the available data in 
order to exclude irrelevant, invalid or unreliable data. As a result of this process, the 
analysts can present their findings in a clear and concise manner, thereby 
influencing the thinking of decision makers. The outcome might be positive or 
negative and, therefore, the analysts should take care when checking for relevance 
and validity of intelligence (Sonne, 2006:122). 
 
The researcher can state, from personal experience, that the analysts at the Financial 
Intelligence Centre make use of iBase, goAML, and Analyst‟s Notebook 
programmes to enhance the intelligence reports that they are required to compile; 
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this includes visual representations of the facts contained in their intelligence 
reports. 
 
The following figures contain examples of Analyst‟s Notebook charts as created by 
analysts during the analysis process (i2 Ltd, 2010:1). This information is hypothetic 
for the purpose of not disclosing any information of a confidential nature (i2 Ltd, 
2010:1).  
 
Figure 2.2 depicts the associations and demographics of “Kevin DUPLEASE”; it is 
an example of a not-that-complicated (elementary) association chart that can be 
created with the Analyst‟s Notebook tool.  
 
Figure 2.3 depicts a more complex chart, combining different styles of charting. It 
makes reference to different timelines and makes use of the grouping together of 
activities that contain common denominators. The following details are provided 
about the chart by the Analyst‟s Notebook tool: “This example shows how several 
styles can be combined in one chart. It shows a timeline chart represented as theme 
lines, with associated event frames, icons and OLE objects. Some entity style 
features to look for: the entity www.i2Group.com has a hyperlink that you can 
activate; the entity Juan PEREZ has aliases using different language alphabets; the 
entity 500 Silver Street has been enlarged for emphasis; the Associates grouping 
box uses a background fill colour.” 
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Figure 2.2  Example of an elementary Analyst‟s Notebook Chart 
Source: i2 Ltd (2010:1) 
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Figure 2.3  Example of a more complex Analyst‟s Notebook Chart 
Source i2 Ltd (2010:5) 
 
 
In an attempt to increase the legibility of the chart in Figure 2.3, the researcher has 
included the following computer screenshots (refer to Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5):  
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Figure 2.4  Close-up screenshot of Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.5  Close-up screenshot of Figure 2.3 
 
In order to determine the participants‟ exposure to analysis software, during the 
interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Do you utilise Analysts‟ 
Notebook or similar software?” they were further asked: “If no, do you have access 
to an analyst, who can assist you in compiling charts and reports (analysis 
products)?” Fourteen (14) participants indicated that they have made use of this 
kind of software to create charts, and sixteen (16) indicated that they have never 
used such software. Only six (6) of the sixteen (16) participants not having access 
to the software on their own computers, had access to analysts assisting them in 
creating analysis charts. Ten (10) participants did not have any access to analysis 
products or software, either directly or indirectly.  
These responses indicated that there is a definitive lack of access by the participants 
to software that could assist in the analysis of crime and also the investigation of 
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financial crimes. This is an area where the Centre could assist, since the majority of 
its analysts have access to these software packages. 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you read and 
understand an analysis chart?” Twenty four (24) participants indicated that they 
understood analysis charts and only six (6) admitted that they do not understand, or 
cannot interpret such charts.  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Do you know what 
the dotted and solid lines on a chart mean?” Eighteen (18) participants indicated 
that they knew, and twelve (12) that they did not know. The participants who 
answered “yes” were further asked: “If yes, can you explain what a dotted line on 
the chart means?” and “Explain briefly what a solid line on a chart means?” All 
eighteen (18) participants who indicated that they knew what the different lines 
meant, answered correctly, namely: “A solid line indicates a confirmed link and a 
dotted line indicates a tentative or unconfirmed link”.  
 
These responses might be indicative of a lack of awareness about the benefits of 
utilising analysis software, especially when conducting financial investigations. 
These kinds of software programmes might be of great assistance during financial 
investigations, especially when large numbers of bank statements need to be 
analysed and interpreted; the utilisation of software as well as trained analysts 
might be of great value to an investigation. 
 
2.4.1.1.4  Dissemination phase 
 
According to Ratcliffe (2008:112), intelligence production is without real value 
unless it is timely and reaches the prospective users in a format that allows for 
quick utilisation of the intelligence. The modern business environment is 
extraordinarily dynamic, resulting in time-sensitive information and intelligence 
that is at highest value at the time of acquisition, but depreciates rapidly from that 
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moment on. Actionable intelligence is perishable, although it may also serve well as 
historical information. The key is accelerated production and dissemination for 
action. The researcher agrees with Newburn et al. (2007:209) that the function of 
dissemination is to ensure that the finished intelligence product is circulated in an 
acceptable time frame to those requiring it.  
 
The researcher can state, from personal experience, that the Financial Intelligence 
Centre disseminates the packaged intelligence from a nodal point to the relevant 
investigation authorities. Depending on the type of intelligence, it might be 
disseminated to the South African Police Service, the South African Revenue 
Service, the relevant intelligence services, or international counterparts of the 
Centre for further investigation by these parties.  
 
2.4.1.1.5  Feedback and review phase 
          
According to the researcher and authors such as Gill (1994:5) and Ratcliffe 
(2008:229), the main difference between information and intelligence is the fact 
that information refers to those pieces of knowledge, reports or data that provide   
raw material for the collectors of information; these information pieces are then 
evaluated, filtered and analysed and processed to become intelligence.  
 
The researcher furthermore supports the opinion of Ratcliffe (2008:113) that the 
intelligence process does not end with delivering the product to the customer. 
Instead, it continues with ongoing dialogue between the producer and the user. If 
the product is to be useful, dissemination should involve timely feedback. 
Intelligence producers need constant feedback from the users. They need to know 
what was useful and what was not useful in order to adjust their intelligence 
requirements. If feedback is obtained, producers can modify their practices to 
further develop those activities that served the user well, and improve or eliminate 
those that did not.  
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According to McDowell (2009:18-29), feedback should include key questions such 
as:  
 Was the product usable?  
 Was the product timely?  
 Was the product in fact used?  
 Did the product meet expectations? If not, why not?  
 What next?  
 
The researcher is of the view that the answers to these questions, in future, could 
lead to refined production, greater use of intelligence by decision makers, and 
further feedback sessions. Thus, production of intelligence actually generates more 
requirements through this interactive process. 
 
The researcher can further emphasize that regular and on-going interaction between 
law enforcement agencies and the Financial Intelligence Centre will be of utmost 
importance in order to continually improve the standard of the Centre‟s products. 
Practical experience has, however, proven that the mission to obtain useful 
feedback is a cumbersome and difficult process, mainly due to the fact that 
investigators in South Africa have huge workloads and are assigned to oversee 
numerous case files at a time.  
 
During the interviews, in order to establish their awareness and understanding of 
the intelligence cycle, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you name the 
different phases in the intelligence cycle?” Only three (3) provided answers that 
correlated with the answers that the researcher found in literature relating to the 
different phases, namely: “identification”, “collection”, “confirmation”, “analysis 
and dissemination”, “problem identification”, and “planning”. Ten (10) of the 
participants provided answers that indicated that they had some idea; their answers 
referred to the following phases: “gathering”, “basic intelligence”, “tasking”, 
“analysis and collection”. Seventeen (17) of the participants indicated that they did 
not know what the phases were. From these answers, it could be concluded that the 
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majority of participants were not aware of the different phases of the intelligence 
cycle. It might be of importance that all investigators should have knowledge of the 
intelligence cycle, as it forms an important part of the investigation process and 
might assist investigators in obtaining relevant intelligence that could be useful 
when applied in investigations.  
 
2.4.2 The different intelligence levels 
 
Although some authors distinguish between tactical, strategic and operational 
intelligence, the researcher will refer to the difference between tactical and strategic 
intelligence. Some authors also use the terms “tactical intelligence” and 
“operational intelligence” interchangeably, as mentioned by McDowell (2009:53). 
The researcher believes that it is important that financial investigators should be 
familiar with both tactical and strategic intelligence, because these types of 
intelligence can be applied in their investigations. 
 
2.4.2.1 Tactical intelligence 
 
The researcher agrees with Brown (2001:64) as well as Ratcliffe (2008:128) 
describing tactical intelligence as information that 
 is directly related to some present activity; 
 must be made available in a timely fashion to operational personnel; 
 should directly support an immediate law enforcement objective; and  
 is primarily used by operational officers (patrolmen and women as well 
as investigators). 
 
McDowell (2009:54) states that tactical and operational intelligence is aimed at 
directly meeting agency objectives and responsibilities by focusing on criminal 
organisations, individuals and modus operandi. This type of intelligence is targeted 
at specific risks and threats with the aim of immediately neutralising it.  
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The researcher can state that the types of tactical intelligence that a person could 
obtain from the Centre include (but is not limited to) descriptive information of an 
individual or legal entity such as the latest physical address and telephone number, 
bank account details, a copy of identity documents and proof of address. The Centre 
provides this kind of information to accountable institutions as part of the client 
identification and verification process as required by law, more specifically in terms 
of Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001).  
 
2.4.2.2  Strategic intelligence 
 
The researcher agrees with Brown (2001:64) as well as Ratcliffe (2008:137) when 
they describe strategic intelligence as information that can be utilised to achieve the 
following results: 
 It is used by decision makers to make projections/predictions about 
future law enforcement needs.  
 It is used to compile threat assessment documents in order to plan 
according to possible threats that are posed by specific criminal 
groupings. 
 It takes other factors (e.g., sociological and economic factors) that might 
contribute to rising crime statistics into account. 
 
McDowell (2009:54) refers to strategic intelligence as intelligence that is obtained 
from the formation of a national defence policy and military plans at both national 
and international levels. The author furthermore states that strategic intelligence 
provides the law enforcement organisation with an overview of criminal 
capabilities, vulnerabilities, trends, and intentions in order to allow for the 
formulation of policies and plans to combat these criminal activities.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that future intelligence, which the Centre could 
provide on a strategic level, will include information about the amount of unbanked 
citizens of South Africa, and the different economical and financial contributors, 
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which contributes to the increase in crime levels (more particularly financial 
crimes).  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that it is important to indicate the nexus between 
financial investigations, intelligence and forensic investigation. The following is a 
brief discussion of forensic investigations, as found in the literature.  
 
2.5   Forensic investigation as a scientific approach to investigations 
 
Although most people will associate the term “forensics” with the types of 
investigation techniques they see on television programmes such as CSI: New 
York, which includes ballistics, chemistry and biology, the term “forensic 
investigation”, as applied in this research, is used to refer to investigations into 
financial crimes such as money-laundering, fraud, racketeering, forgery, tax 
evasion, embezzlement and bribery.  
 
It is deemed appropriate to define forensic investigation adequately, with specific 
emphasis on financial forensic investigation. According to Van der Westhuizen 
(1996:9), the term “forensic” refers to a definite competency that is aimed at 
providing law enforcement with specific scientific knowledge. The researcher 
agrees with Zonderman (1999:3) that scientific knowledge and techniques must be 
applied to a legal challenge to be classified as forensic investigation. 
 
Newburn et al. (2007:381) refer to the application of forensic science to criminal 
investigation as the application of specialist skills and knowledge to complex 
practical problems, for example, the expert witnesses that will testify to prove that 
the bullet that was found at the crime scene was fired from a specific weapon. 
 
It is the experience of the researcher that when the investigation of crime is 
conducted according to tested and trusted investigative methods and techniques, it 
will ensure that all possible evidence have been gathered, thus bringing a complete 
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case before court. The evidence must, furthermore, be gathered in such a fashion 
that it will pass the test of admissibility in court (Newburn et al., 2007:385). 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that the following forensic techniques, namely, 
forensic auditing, statement analysis, intelligence utilisation and offender profiling 
are relevant to financial investigations.   
 
By comparing the views of the various authors mentioned earlier, it appears that the 
wide scope of general science, for example, natural science, economic science and 
social science all find application within the science of forensic investigation. The 
researcher also agrees with Bologna (1995:29) that the skills of a forensic 
investigator correlate in a number of ways to that of an auditor. The researcher can 
share, from personal experience, that the analysts working at the Financial 
Intelligence Centre apply these skills on a daily basis. Analysts should have 
inquisitive minds and seek to find explanations for things that don‟t appear to be the 
norm or what one would logically expect, as the forensic investigative process aims 
at incorporating proper financial analysis, seeking documentary evidence of proper 
accounting/business transactions and following proper legal process (Bologna, 
1995:32). 
 
Newburn et al. (2007:381), furthermore, emphasise the importance of knowledge 
complementarity as “… what each party needs to know of the other‟s work to 
enhance the work they perform together”. The researcher supports Van der 
Westhuizen‟s (1996:357) argument that successfully prosecuted and convicted 
cases have improved substantially since the South African Police Service adopted a 
scientific approach towards criminal investigation.   
 
In the following subsection, the researcher will introduce the reader to the types of 
crimes that might be linked to a financial aspect.  
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2.6   Types of financial crimes 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that almost every crime might have some kind of 
financial motivation and agrees that the following are examples of crimes with a 
financial aspect, as listed by United States Internal Revenue Service (1993:5):  
 Fraud     
 Tax evasion 
 Bribery 
 Embezzlement 
 Larceny 
 Forgery 
 Counterfeiting 
 Blackmail 
 Extortion 
 Kickbacks 
 Racketeering 
 Insider trading 
 Money laundering 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “According to your 
knowledge, name the different types of crimes that can be regarded as financial 
crimes?” Almost all of the participants, i.e., twenty-nine (29), were able to name 
one or more types of crimes. Their answers corresponded to the crimes obtained 
from the literature study as listed above. Only one (1) participant was not able to 
name any type of financial crime. The answers of the other twenty-nine (29) 
participants were grouped together, because some of them provided more than one 
answer, and a number of them provided similar answers. The crimes mentioned, 
included the following (the amounts in brackets indicate the amount of 
answers/similar answers):  
 “Fraud” (25)  
 “Theft” (25) 
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 “Money laundering” (20) 
 “Tax evasion” (15) 
 “Vat fraud” (9) 
 “Corruption” (9) 
 “Counterfeiting” (3) 
 “Cheque fraud” (2) 
 “Credit card fraud” (1) 
 “Forgery” (1) 
 “ATM card skimming” (1) 
 “Company fraud” (1)  
 “Custom duties fraud” (1) 
 “Not paying deducted PAYE over to SARS” (1) 
It is clear, from the crimes mentioned, that almost all the participants knew what 
types of crimes could be categorised as financial crimes.  
 
Gottschalk (2010:180) states that financial crimes often occurs as part of organised 
crime and these criminal groups often make use of dedicated money launderers. 
The researcher further agrees with this author when stating that, according to the 
rational choice theory, people commit crimes after considering the risks of detection 
plus punishment and comparing it to the rewards of completing these acts 
successfully.  
 
The researcher shares the opinion of the United States Internal Revenue Service 
(1993:8) that the abovementioned crimes are what people normally think of when 
they hear the term “financial crime”. However, these days, investigators also use 
financial evidence to build cases against persons suspected of crimes such as 
kidnapping, espionage, murder and arson. In a murder or arson investigation, for 
example, the investigator might, as a result of financial evidence, link an individual 
to a case that might have seemed totally unrelated. The investigator might identify 
that the wife of the murder victim paid a substantial sum of money to the suspect, 
possibly indicating that she has been involved in the planning of the murder (e.g., 
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the Taliep Petersen case in the Western Cape during 2006, where Petersen‟s wife, 
Najwa, was convicted of planned or premeditated murder).  
 
According to Van Duyne et al. (2001:18), tactical financial investigations focus on 
specific targets such as suspects and related facts, tangible objects, money, and 
structures (which include businesses as well as social structures). The value of a 
method is sometimes better substantiated by explaining the flaws and human 
mistakes that took place during its application; therefore, the following example 
from Van Duyne et al. (2001:151) has been identified by the researcher as being 
useful to describe the utilisation of financial information in a narcotics case: 
 
“An international drug dealer, operating from Amsterdam, was for many 
years the prime target of the police. He was considered very wealthy and 
dangerous. He also had contacts within law enforcement. As the 
investigation squad observed him for years, one member obtained financial 
information, which aroused nobody‟s interest. The files containing the 
financial documents were placed in a storeroom. A researcher when 
conducting research on organised crime figures studied the financial file 
linked to this case and got permission to inspect the fiscal files of every 
person, whether friend or relative connected to the main target. His 
attention was drawn to a loan of 500000 Euros from Hong Kong for the 
acquisition of a villa. The notary act looked unusual and he asked the fiscal 
inspectors who would go on a mission to Hong Kong for another 
investigation, if they could pass along the address where the loaning 
company resided. They detected that the firm was not capable to provide 
such a loan, because it was just a shell company and didn‟t conduct 
legitimate business. This is just one example of how financial information 
can assist in shedding light on a normal criminal investigation.” 
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2.6.1   Money laundering 
 
This research focused on the contributions of a South African organisation, namely, 
the Financial Intelligence Centre, in the fight against crime; therefore, the 
researcher will only elaborate on the financial crimes with which the South African 
readers are more familiar.  
 
The following is an introduction and overview of the financial crime of money 
laundering in the Eastern and Southern Africa region (refer to Chapter 1, paragraph 
1.5.1 for a definition of money laundering) 
 
Table 2.1 below presents an overview of the estimates of the extent of money 
laundering activity in the Southern African sub-region. It is alarming that as far 
back as 1999, the total amount of internally laundered money as well as money 
brought into the region amounted to just over US $ 18.07 billion (Goredema, 
2003:206). The researcher agrees with the author that money laundering in the sub-
region of Southern Africa occurs on a significant scale and that statistics often cited 
internationally are based on the results of the Walker model. According to the 
Walker model, a total of US $ 22 billion was laundered through the financial 
systems of Southern Africa in 1998 (Goredema, 2003:206). 
 
Table 2.1 Estimates of Money Laundering 
Amounts in US $ Millions 
Country Internal Outgoing Total 
Generated 
Incoming Total 
Laundered 
% 
Internal 
% 
Outgoing 
% 
Incoming 
Botswana 123.4 117.6 241.0 1722 1845.0 51.2 48.8 93.3 
Kenya 734.8 140.0 874.8 77 811.8 84.0 16.0 9.5 
Lesotho 0.9 0.1 1.0 458 458.7 86.4 13.6 99.8 
Malawi 96.4 47.0 143.4 62 158.1 67.2 32.8 39.1 
Mauritius 95.2 61.4 156.6 1129 1224.5 60.8 39.2 92.2 
Mozambique 87.6 34.1 121.7 17 104.8 72.0 28.0 16.4 
Namibia 114.6 84.3 198.9 489 603.5 57.6 42.4 81.0 
Seychelles 68.1 4.8 73.0 1963 2031.5 93.4 6.6. 96.6 
South Africa 6143.7 4095.8 10239.5 566 6707.9 60.0 40.0 8.4 
Swaziland 20.3 3.2 23.5 414 434.8 86.4 13.6 95.3 
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Country Internal Outgoing Total 
Generated 
Incoming Total 
Laundered 
% 
Internal 
% 
Outgoing 
% 
Incoming 
Tanzania 693.5 124.3 817.8 63 756.7 84.8 15.2 8.3 
Uganda 611.4 130.6 742.0 54 665.9 82.4 17.6 8.2 
Zambia 1098.0 427.0 1525.0 177 1274.6 72 28.0 13.9 
Zimbabwe 726.6 354.7 1081.3 272 999.1 67.2 32.8 27.3 
 
   Source: Goredema (2003:206) 
 
From the table above, it is evident that South Africa had the largest amount of 
laundered money in US $ millions value, followed by the Republics of Seychelles, 
Botswana, Zambia and Mauritius. It is interesting, given the fact that Seychelles 
and Mauritius are island countries; however, it has to be kept in mind that these are 
popular tourist destinations that attract many international tourists bringing foreign 
currency of higher value into these countries. 
 
Roper (2001:96) explains that in the light of cross-border currency movements, 
which have been demonstrated to be conducted primarily by means of currency 
smuggling and money laundering, member countries of the Egmont Group have 
been requested to consider putting mechanisms in place for the monitoring of cross-
border currency movements. 
 
The researcher supports the statement by Michell (2010:44) that South Africa is one 
of only a handful of countries that, in line with exchange controls, tracks incoming 
and outgoing currency. The levels of currency flows have important implications 
for macroeconomic policy, trade and financial purposes.  The Financial Intelligence 
Centre has been involved in pilot projects during the 2009/10 financial year with 
regards to receiving Cash Threshold Reports, Cash Conveyance Reports and 
Electronic Transfer Reports, resulting in an increase in its data analysis and 
reporting capabilities (Michell, 2010:37-44). 
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The researcher agrees with various authors on the three stages of money laundering, 
namely, placement, layering and integration (Goredema, 2003:38; Michell, 2004:8; 
Klein, 2008:2; Zagaris, 2010:67; Financial Action Task Force, 2011:1).  
 
The following is a brief discussion regarding the three stages of money laundering, 
namely, placement, layering and integration.  
 
2.6.1.1  Stages of money laundering 
 
Stage One: Placement  
 
According to Van Duyne et al. (2001:71), Klein (2008:2) and Zagaris (2010:67), 
placement is the introducing of the illicit funds into the financial cycle. Even if the 
funds were already in a bank or brokerage account (as in fraud cases), it is that first 
step of it being illicit funds that is viewed as placement. The most common 
examples of placement is a drug dealer who needs to get large quantities of smaller 
currency bills into the banking system, or a money-launderer who is making use of 
the “smurfing method” and needs access to an extensive reserve of cash couriers. 
 
The term “smurfing” is explained by Klein (2008:45) and Wikipedia (2011a) as 
banking industry jargon that is used to describe the act of splitting a large financial 
transaction into smaller transactions to avoid scrutiny by regulators and law 
enforcement investigators, and the practice of executing financial transactions (such 
as the making of bank deposits) in a specific pattern calculated to avoid the creation 
of certain records and reports required by law, such as Cash Threshold Reports 
required in terms of Section 28 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 
2001). The requirements of this and other relevant sections of the Act will be 
discussed in more detail during the later chapters of this research.   
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Stage Two: Layering  
 
The researcher agrees with various authors that layering is the moving and 
transferring of funds in order to disguise the origin and true ownership of the money 
(Klein, 2008:2; Zagaris, 2010:67). This phase can be the most important and the 
most difficult – it truly separates the professionals from the amateurs. In this stage, 
the money can, for example, change accounts, form, ownership, and country. It can 
go into and out of trusts and shell companies, it can buy or sell real estate or 
physical goods (assets), it can move through different jurisdictions – anything to 
confuse or eliminate a paper trail and make tracing it back to the suspect very 
difficult. 
 
Stage Three: Integration 
 
According to Klein (2008:2) and Zagaris (2010:67), integration is the process of 
using apparently legitimate transactions to disguise the illicit proceeds, allowing the 
laundered funds to be disbursed back to the criminal. This is when the criminal 
takes economic advantage of the illicit funds and it appears to have come from 
legitimate sources, for example, the drug dealer who buys a mansion, expensive car, 
yacht, or even airplanes to move drugs and other money. In the case of the 
airplanes, it will likely be bought through a front or shell leasing company, who will 
rent it to a front or shell freight company, so that when the airplane is ultimately 
impounded somewhere by law enforcement, it cannot be traced back to the dealer. 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Briefly explain the 
different stages of money laundering?” They responded as follows: two (2) 
participants indicated the three stages of money laundering correctly, namely, 
“Placement, layering and integration”. Fifteen (15) participants provided the 
following answers to this question: “Generate documentation for the purposes of 
gaining money (VAT refunds)”, “Conceal the origin of the money”, “After a crime 
has been committed, change the money to look legitimate”, “Committing a 
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predicate offence‟, “Information phase”, “Obtaining money illegally and then 
cleaning it”, “When selling drugs the seller takes the money out of South Africa 
without declaring it”, “A corruptor, a corruptee, and a wrongful act”, “The basic 
crime and thereafter they try to hide the money for instance in an offshore account”, 
“Establish a legitimate business to clean the money”, “Repeat offences”, and 
“Syndicates”. Thirteen (13) of the participants did not know what the three stages 
are, or elected not to provide answers. The researcher concluded from the obtained 
answers that the majority of participants were not familiar with the different stages 
of money laundering.  
 
2.6.1.2 Dimensions of money laundering 
 
The researcher agrees with Goredema (2003:184) on the three dimensions of money 
laundering, namely: 
 Internal money laundering, characterised by the laundering of the 
proceeds of, or assets derived from crime within the country where 
the crime was committed 
 Incoming money laundering, in which the laundered proceeds or 
assets are derived from crimes that were committed outside the 
country and thereafter introduced into the country; and 
 Outgoing money laundering, wherein the proceeds of crimes 
committed within the country are laundered through exportation to 
one or more countries.  
 
According to the researcher‟s experience, the fact that there is close co-operation 
among Financial Intelligence Units internationally eases some of the burden on 
investigators when they are faced with an investigation that comprises of all three 
the abovementioned dimensions of laundering.  
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2.7 Asset tracking, freezing and forfeiture 
 
Van Duyne et al. (2001:152) point out that other aspects of financial investigations 
that form an integral part of the support service that is provided by Units such as the 
Financial Intelligence Centre, are the tracking, freezing and confiscation of assets 
that are linked to a known criminal or his or her associates. The most usual form of 
tracking and freezing of assets that were derived from crime occur at and after a 
house raid, when the detectives draw up an extensive list of every item they could 
find. These items can range from household goods and furniture to the most 
expensive cars and even race horses and artwork.  
 
When dealing with tracking, freezing and confiscation of assets, it is also important 
to understand what criminal property means. Blair and Brent (2008:162) state that 
“Property is „criminal property‟ if (a) it constitutes a person‟s benefit from criminal 
conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole or in part and whether directly or 
indirectly), and (b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or 
represents such a benefit. The latter element gives the expression „criminal 
property‟ a somewhat artificial meaning because the knowledge of the person 
dealing with the property becomes relevant at this point. It further extends to 
property anywhere in the world and includes money, all forms of property, real or 
personal, heritable or movable, things in action and other things intangible or 
incorporeal property”.  
 
The United States Internal Revenue Service (1993:314) refers to forfeiture as the 
means to divest criminals of their illegal gains. The later chapters of this research 
will address the relevant sections of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 
of 2001), dealing with freezing of funds and asset forfeiture.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher agrees with Bedi (2004:413) that each launderer wants 
to hide the criminal origin of his assets by creating four kinds of “distances” 
between the predicate offence and the money:  
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 Distance in geography: by moving assets out of the country.  
 Distance in person: this can refer to creating a front-man or 
companies. 
 Distance in product: the launderer will try to change the money into 
some other asset. 
 Distance in time: if the criminal successfully hides the proceeds of 
crime for 10 years, he/she is well on the way to safety.  
 
The researcher believes that the fact that criminals tend to hide the origin of their 
assets, illustrates the vital importance of the use of intelligence in investigating 
these types of crimes. 
 
2.8 Summary 
   
In this chapter, the researcher introduced the reader to the concepts of criminal, 
forensic and financial investigations, and intelligence. The researcher furthermore 
introduced the reader to the elements of the intelligence cycle, as well as the term 
“money laundering”, which includes the different stages and dimensions of money 
laundering.  
 
The world keeps on changing and, therefore, investigators need to keep track of all 
the relevant investigation techniques that may assist them to optimally investigate 
financial crimes.  Chapter 3 will provide the reader with an overview of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE 
3.1   Introduction 
Since the early nineties, South Africa has developed a comprehensive legal 
framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The first set of 
provisions that dealt with money laundering was contained in the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act, Act 140 of 1992 (De Koker 2007: Com 2-3). Subsequently, a 
number of other acts have been promulgated that all deal with the concepts of 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The relevant legislation that 
has provided the framework for establishing a South African Financial Intelligence 
Unit will be discussed later during this chapter. 
Michell (2004:5) explains that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 
2001), together with the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre, is based 
on the Government‟s understanding of the longstanding, global effort to combat 
organised crime, money laundering and terrorist financing.  
According to De Koker (2007: Com 5-9), the FIC is still a relatively young 
institution that was formally established on 31 January 2002, and commenced with 
the receiving of Section 29 reports from February 2003. The fact that the Centre has 
become operational during February 2003 as a part of South Africa‟s efforts to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing in terms of Section 2 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001), in itself, was a major 
achievement according to De Koker (2007: Com 5-9).   
This chapter will mainly focus on providing an overview of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre. The overview will be explained by sharing background 
information about the origin and establishment of the Centre, and discussing some 
of the international organisations and regulatory bodies that also had an influence 
on the establishment of the Centre. The researcher will, subsequently, explain the 
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mandate and mission and vision of the Centre; and lastly, touch on some of the 
strategic achievements, as reported by the Centre in its annual reports, to enlighten 
the reader regarding the functions (i.e., what the Centre does) of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre. 
This overview might assist in creating awareness among investigators who would 
like to make use of the intelligence that is obtainable from the Centre.  
As Smit (2001:1), as well as De Koker (2007: Com 1-3), rightly pointed out, the 
establishment of a financial intelligence unit formed a vital part of the fight against 
money laundering and terrorist financing. According to Michell (2008:15), all 
countries were encouraged to establish financial intelligence units in terms of 
Recommendation 26 of the Financial Action Task Force‟s “40+9 
Recommendations”. Prior to the existence of the Centre, all Suspicious and/or 
Unusual Transaction Reports (STRS) were reported to the Commercial Crime Unit 
of the South African Police Service in terms of Section 7 of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act, (Act no. 121 of 1998), (De Koker, 2007: POCA-13).  
3.2 The establishment of the Centre 
According to Michell (2004:3) and De Koker (2007: Com 5-9), the Financial 
Intelligence Centre, also known as “The Centre” or “FIC”, was formally established 
on 31 January 2002. However, the researcher can state that the Centre became 
operational on 3 February 2003; when the first reports were received. In its first few 
years of existence, the FIC managed to play a leading role in the implementation of 
money laundering and terror financing laws.  
The researcher wanted to measure the awareness of the participants about the 
existence of the Centre by asking the thirty (30) participants the following question: 
“What year was the Financial Intelligence Centre established?” Only two (2) 
participants answered correctly, namely, “2003”. The other twenty-eight (28) either 
did not provide an answer or indicated the following years: “1995”, “1998/99”, 
“2000”, “2000-2005”, “2001”, “2004”, “2005”, “2008”, “2009” and “2010”. 
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It became clear, from these answers, that the majority of the participants were not 
aware of the year when the Centre was established; this might indicate that they 
were not aware of the existence of the Centre at all.  
Michell (2009:15) indicated that South Africa became a member of the Eastern and 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) during August, 
2002, and a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) during June, 2003. 
South Africa also became a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units during 2003. The Egmont Group was formed during 1995 by a number of 
financial intelligence units that identified the need for an international forum for co-
operation and information exchange to support the anti-money laundering regimes 
of member countries (Michell, 2004:6).  
The researcher supports the opinion of De Koker (2007: Com 5-9) that the FIC 
played a key role in South Africa‟s presidency of the FATF in 2005-2006, and that 
the reporting system of the FIC appears to be working well. 
In a further attempt by the researcher to measure awareness, the thirty (30) 
participants were asked: “Where is the FIC‟s office?” Only nine (9) of the 
participants answered correctly, namely, “in Centurion”. The others provided the 
following answers (the amounts in brackets indicate the amount of answers/similar 
answers): “FSB building at Riverwalk” (6), “Treasury building in Pretoria” (2), 
“Johannesburg” (2) and “don‟t know” (11). The researcher is of the opinion that 
this further indicates a lack of awareness about the existence of the Centre. 
3.3 Relevant legislation 
The following Acts provide the Centre with a comprehensive legal framework and 
mandate of providing intelligence to the relevant authorities and, therefore, 
contributing to the fight against crime.  
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3.3.1 The Proceeds of Crime Act, (Act 76 of 1996) (PRCA) 
This Act provides for the recovery of the proceeds of crime, the prohibition of 
money laundering, and an obligation to report certain information and all matters 
connected to this information. 
3.3.2 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, (Act 121 of 1998) (POCA) 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act introduces measures to combat organised 
crime, money laundering and criminal activities; and to prohibit certain activities 
relating to racketeering activities. De Koker (2007: Com 3-5) points out that the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act creates two sets of money laundering offences, 
namely, general money laundering offences involving proceeds of all forms of 
crime, and offences involving proceeds of a pattern of racketeering.  
The researcher agrees with De Koker (2007: Com 3-18) on the definition of a 
“pattern of racketeering activity” as the planned, on-going, continuous or repeated 
participation or involvement in any number of serious offences; a pattern requires 
that at least two listed offences were committed during a specific term.   
3.3.3 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), as well as the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act, (Act 11 of 2008) 
These Acts were both created to establish the Financial Intelligence Centre and a 
Counter-Money Laundering Advisory Council in order to combat money 
laundering and terror financing activities, impose certain duties on institutions to 
report suspicious activities, and provide for the sharing of information by the Centre 
and supervisory bodies as part of its roles and responsibilities. The amendment Act 
furthermore provides for the registration of accountable and reporting institutions 
and provides the Centre and supervisory bodies with powers to conduct inspections. 
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3.3.4 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, (Act 12 of 2004) 
(PRECCA) 
De Koker (2007: Com 3-25) explains that Chapter 2 of PRECCA identifies and 
defines a host of new offences related to corrupt activities, which include the 
following six parts:  
Part 1: The general offence of corruption. 
Part 2: The offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to specific persons 
(public officers, foreign public officials, agents, members of legislative authority, 
judicial officers and prosecuting authority).  
Part 3: The offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to the receiving or 
offering of unauthorised gratification by or to a party to an employment 
relationship. 
Part 4: Offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to specific matters, which 
include witnesses and evidential material in certain proceedings, contracts, 
procuring and withdrawal of tenders, auctions, sporting events, gambling games or 
games of chance.  
Part 5: Miscellaneous offences relating to the possible conflict of interest and other 
unacceptable conduct.  
Part 6: Other offences relating to corrupt activities such as the accessory to or after 
an offence and attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person to commit an 
offence. 
3.3.5 The Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act, (Act 33 of 2004) (POCDATARA) 
This Act was created to a) provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and 
related activities, b) provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences 
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associated or connected with terrorist activities, c) provide for Convention offences, 
d) give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related 
activities, e) provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions, which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist 
and related activities, f) provide for measures to prevent and combat terror 
financing and related activities, and g) provide for investigative measures in respect 
of such activities. 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “According to your 
knowledge, name the legislation that is relevant to the existence of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre?” Twenty-one (21) of the thirty (30) participants were able to 
mention examples of the relevant acts (some mentioned more than one act; the 
amounts in brackets indicate the amount of answers/similar answers):  
 “FICA” (18)  
 “POCA” (7)  
 “Corruption Act” (3)  
 “Criminal Procedures Act” (3) 
 “POCDATARA” (2) 
 “Insolvency Act” 
 “PFMA” 
 “Municipalities Act” 
 “Whistle blowers Act” 
 “Income tax Act” 
 “SARS Act” 
 “The Constitution” 
Nine (9) participants were unable to mention any applicable legislation. The 
researcher is of the opinion that these answers are an indication of a lack of 
knowledge about the relevant legislation and that this might indicate a general lack 
of awareness about the existence of the Centre, or the specific mandate of the 
Centre.  
62 
 
3.4  The researcher‟s personal involvement at the Financial Intelligence Centre 
The researcher formed part of an initial group of five analysts who were all 
seconded from the South African Revenue Service to assist with the establishment 
of the Monitoring and Analysis Department of the Centre during the course of 
2003. The accountable institutions were encouraged, from the onset of the Centre, 
to submit their Suspicious Transaction Reports electronically by capturing the 
relevant information on the Centre‟s website. “Accountable institutions” are defined 
in terms of Schedule 1 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), 
and forms part of the 19 categories of institutions with reporting obligations in 
terms of suspicious transactions. These institutions include banks, casinos, estate 
agents, lawyers, and money remitters.  
Madinger (2006:292) believes that international best practice has proven that the 
electronic submission of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) assists in the 
optimisation of the analysis cycle (from receiving the STRs to the dissemination of 
intelligence products to the relevant law enforcement agency), and it also improves 
turnaround times with regards to providing warning intelligence products to law 
enforcement agencies. The researcher experienced this (the same) and can, 
therefore, agree with the author.   
According to Michell (2008:35), the Monitoring and Analysis (M&A) and 
Compliance Departments had one senior manager overseeing both departments 
during the first few years of existence. The Centre expanded rapidly and the staff 
complement grew from less than 20 members in 2003 to more than 120 members in 
2008. Michell (2010:21) also revealed that the number of employees at the Centre 
grew to 140 during the 2009/10 financial year and the target is to employ 250 staff 
members by 2015.  
3.5      Objectives for the existence of the Centre 
According to the website of the Centre, supported by De Koker (2007: Com  1-3); 
Smit (2001:3); Michell (2008:11) and Michell (2009:12), the principal objective of 
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the Centre is to assist in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities, as 
well as the combating of organised crime, and money laundering and terrorist 
financing activities. Further objectives include the following:  
 Sharing of collected information with investigative authorities, SARS and 
the Intelligence Services in order to facilitate the administration and 
enforcement of the laws of South Africa; and 
 Information exchange with international counterparts (financial intelligence 
units) regarding money laundering activities and other related offences. 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “What are the 
objectives for the existence of the Centre?” Only two (2) of the participants gave 
correct answers, namely: “To assist in the identification of proceeds of unlawful 
activities and combating of money laundering”, and “To exchange information with 
similar bodies in other countries regarding money laundering and similar offences”.  
 
Twelve (12) participants had some idea and answered the following (some provided 
more than one answer; the amounts in brackets indicate the amount of 
answers/similar answers): “The Centre helps with the investigation of Money 
Laundering” (9), “Provides intelligence regarding financial crimes” (3), and 
“Assists with compiling financial profiles of suspects” (2). Sixteen (16) participants 
did not know the objectives for the existence of the Centre, or did not provide any 
answers. The researcher is of the view that the lack of knowledge about the 
objectives of the Centre might indicate a lack of awareness among investigators 
about the Centre and its mandate.  
  
According to Michell (2008:15), the values of the Centre are reflected in the 
following goals, as set for the members of the Centre: 
 Strive towards a spirit of Ubuntu. People demonstrate integrity in all 
their actions through the spirit of Ubuntu, and a person with Ubuntu is 
open and available to others, affirming others, not feeling threatened that 
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others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that 
comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is 
diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, or when others 
are tortured or oppressed (Wikipedia, 2011b). 
 Display pride and discipline in work; 
 Strive for excellence and professionalism; 
 Optimise relationships with stakeholders and partners; and 
 Ensure the security of organisational assets and information. 
 
The researcher agrees with Michell (2009:12) that the Centre should furthermore 
perform the following functions in terms of Section 4 of the Financial intelligence 
centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), in order to achieve its objectives: 
 
 Monitor and provide guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory 
bodies and other persons regarding the performance of their duties and 
their compliance with the provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, (Act 38 of 2001). 
 Retain all information obtained and received pursuant to compliance 
with the provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 
2001). 
 
3.6 The Structure of the Centre 
 
To enable readers to understand the structure of the Centre, the following 
diagram has been adapted from the Annual Reports of the Centre (Michell, 
2008:21 and 2010:48). It provides the reader with an overview of the 
different Departments within the Centre.  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you 
name a few of the departments in the FIC?” Only six (6) of the participants 
could name some of these departments, namely: “Monitoring and Analysis”, 
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“Compliance”, “Legal”, “Human Resources”, “IT” and “Finance”. This 
means that twenty-four (24) of the participants could not name a single 
department in the FIC. The participants‟ responses to this question 
furthermore confirmed the researcher‟s view that there is a general lack of 
awareness among investigators about the Centre and its functions.  
 
The researcher will briefly discuss each department to provide the reader 
with a better understanding of the operational structure of the Centre.  
 
Figure 3.1 
Structure of the Centre Michell (2010:48) 
 
3.6.1  The Office of the Director 
 
Michell (2008:20) explains that the Office of the Director provides operational 
support to the Director of the Centre and also houses the communications 
department of the Centre. The communications department is responsible for co-
ordinating all internal and external official communication and retaining and 
enhancing all stakeholder relationships. 
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3.6.2   The Legal and Policy Department   
Michell (2008:22) reports that the Legal and Policy Department is responsible for 
three areas of responsibility, namely, the administration of all the relevent sections 
of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001); the co-ordination of the 
engagements with international and regional policy-forming and standard-setting 
organisations [such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Eastern And 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)]; and the provision 
of policy advice on matters of a strategic nature, which concerns money laundering 
and terror financing.  
3.6.2.1  Legal and Policy achievements 
The Legal and Policy Department of the Centre developed a set of amendments to 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), as part of the process to 
improve the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework in 
South Africa. With these amendments, the department aim to improve the legal 
framework for the supervision of compliance with the provisions of the act. These 
amendments will be implemented soon, since the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Amendment Act, (Act 11 of 2008), has come into operation on 1 December 2010. 
The need has been identified for revision of the list of supervisory bodies as 
contained in Schedule 2 of the Act (Michell, 2008:22).  
Michell (2008:22) points out that South Africa, as a member of the FATF, 
underwent a Mutual Evaluation during 2008 to assess the extent to which the South 
African systems and mechanisms, in combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing, meet the international standards and requirements. 
This evaluation process required a vast amount of co-operation among a number of 
public and private sector bodies. The Legal and Policy Department was responsible 
for the facilitation of the preparations for this evaluation (Michell, 2008:23). The 
evaluation process culminated in a debate regarding the Evaluation Report on South 
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Africa that took place at the FATF plenary meeting in Paris, France, during 
February 2009 (Michell, 2008:24).  
3.6.3 The Compliance and Prevention Department 
The Compliance and Prevention Department is responsible for compliance 
oversight of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). A core 
function of this department is to inform, advise and collaborate with other 
supervisory bodies in order to ensure effective supervision of compliance (Michell, 
2008:23).  
Michell (2008:23) mentions that this department also conducts inspections and 
issues written guidance notes to the industry. The department‟s preventative focus 
makes provision for the creation and expansion of public awareness, and the 
creation and issuance of guidance notes for accountable institutions; it also provides 
compliance related training regarding the obligations in terms of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), to the relevant affected entities.  
3.6.3.1  Complaince and Prevention achievements 
Michell (2010:35) reports that the Compliance and Prevention Department engaged 
in responding to 529 queries from members of the public during the 2009/10 
financial year; these queries were mainly related to practical challenges that 
accountable institutions and the public encountered during the application of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). This department has also been 
involved in compliance reviews and several other stakeholder engagements. 
Regular meetings are held to obtain feedback from the different industries. The 
following table has been adopted from Michell (2010:35) and reflects the 
compliance reviews that were conducted from the 2006/07 financial year until the 
2009/10 financial year.  
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Table 3.1   Compliance reviews conducted: 2006/07 – 2009/10, Michell (2010:35) 
Supervisory body Industry/ 
sector 
2006
/07 
2007
/08 
2008
/09 
2009
/10 
National Gambling Board Casinos 27 24 7 35 
National Gambling Board Bookmakers - 42 43 28 
Estate Agency Affairs Board Estate Agents 8 13 27 11 
Reserve Bank (Exchange 
Control Department) 
Authorised 
dealers with 
limited 
authority 
16 25 43 21 
Financial Services Board Insurance 
Companies 
- 52 16 - 
Financial Services Board Financial 
services  
providers 
- 26 3 25 
Financial Services Board Collective 
investment 
scheme 
managers 
- 24 30 4 
JSE Limited JSE 
stockbrokers 
and authorised 
users of the 
Bond 
Exchange 
- 3 9 19 
Law Society of SA Attorneys - 0 27 29 
Financial Intelligence Centre Postbank - 27 30 27 
TOTAL  51 236 235 199 
Based on the researcher‟s experience at the Financial Intelligence Centre, the 
figures contained in the table above can be interpreted as follows: the Financial 
Intelligence Centre‟s Compliance Department has conducted its highest number of 
compliance reviews, namely, 52, in conjunction with the Financial Services Board 
during the 2007/08 financial year. The second highest number of compliance 
reviews (43) has been conducted in conjunction with the National Gambling Board 
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(on bookmakers) and the Reserve Bank (Exchange Control Department) (on 
authorised dealers with limited authority) during the 2008/09 financial year.  
It is further evident that the Estate Agency Affairs Board experienced challenges, 
since this industry conducted the least compliance reviews over the period under 
review (2006-2010).  
The researcher also concludes, from the figures above, that the Law Society of SA 
and the JSE Limited also experienced challenges, because these sectors also 
conducted limited numbers of compliance reviews during the reporting period.  
3.6.4 The Monitoring and Analysis Department  
The researcher, being a member of the Monitoring and Analysis Department 
(M&A) of the Centre, can confirm on the grounds of personal experience, that this 
department plays an important role in supporting law enforcement agencies to 
combat complex financial and organised crimes. This is achieved through constant 
interaction with the relevant agencies as well as the accountable institutions and 
reporting institutions.  
The Centre receives its Suspicious Transaction Reports from the relevant 
institutions such as banks, casinos and estate agents via the M&A Department (i.e., 
the point of entry at the Centre). Due to the fact that electronic reporting is preferred 
and encouraged, the majority of reports are submitted via the Centre‟s website and 
only a limited amount of reports are submitted per fax or hand-delivery.  
The researcher can confirm that the Suspicious Transaction Reports are read, 
captured, assessed and analysed upon receipt, whereafter selected reports are 
referred to the relevant agencies for possible further investigation. Michell 
(2010:15) observes that 29 411 STRs have been submitted to the Centre during the 
2009/2010 financial year.  
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The researcher can, from personal experience, report that each received report is 
read and evaluated to determine if further action is necessary. This analysis process 
involves queries for additional financial transaction data, searches on other data 
sources and checks with partner agencies.  
 
Reports are assessed and classified in terms of the suspected activity and data 
quality, and rated on the significance of the matter as described by the report. If 
analysts determine that a report may be of interest to one of the Centre‟s 
stakeholders, the report may be referred to that agency for further investigation 
(Michell, 2008:33). 
 
Michell (2008:33-38) points out that the Monitoring and Analysis Department 
(M&A) is furthermore responsible for producing financial intelligence assessments 
on matters of potential interest to the Centre‟s domestic and international 
stakeholders. The unit consists of a number of highly skilled analysts who are 
experts in interrogating the Centre‟s databases and preparing intelligence 
assessments detailing the financial behaviour of persons, thereby highlighting 
suspicious and/or potential criminal activity.  
 
The researcher can furthermore add that additional matters of interest can also be 
identified via manual detection, or via a request from a law enforcement agency for 
analysis on a specified suspect or entity. Assessments that were disseminated to a 
partner agency may initiate an investigation, assist to further a current investigation, 
or it may be used for intelligence purposes only. 
The researcher supports Michell (2008:34) in stating that the Monitoring and 
Analysis Department disseminated 1 221 analysed reports during the 2008/2009 
financial year to partner agencies, which included the South African Police Service, 
the Asset Forfeiture Unit, various supervisory bodies, the Intelligence Services and 
the South African Revenue Service. It also included 9 spontaneous disclosures to 
foreign financial intelligence units. 
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The Monitoring and Analysis Department also responds to requests for information 
when received from authorised officers from the relevant law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies in South Africa or the centre‟s international counterparts. The 
annual reports of the Centre reflected that the following number of requests were 
received from domestic law enforcement agencies over the previous three financial 
years: 251 in 2008/09, 393 in 2009/10 and 495 in 2010/11 (Michell, 2009:35), 
(Michell, 2010:31) and (Michell, 2011:3). Although this might seem like a relative 
increase in requests, the researcher can share, from personal experience, that a great 
number of these requests could not be responded to due to the fact that it contained 
requests for information that falls outside the mandate of the Centre.  
3.6.4.1  Monitoring and Analysis Achievements 
The researcher experienced the Monitoring and Analysis Department‟s progress as 
reported in Michell (2010:28) regarding the Centre taking important steps forward 
in improving the consumption of its products. This is partly due to a growing 
awareness among the public regarding their reporting responsibilities, as well as 
training and awareness campaigns that are conducted by accountable institutions 
such as banks, casinos and estate agencies. The following table has been adopted 
from Michell (2011:6); it depicts the number of Suspicious Transaction Reports that 
the Centre received for the period from inception, in 2003, until the 2010/11 
financial year.  
Table 3.2 Volumes of Suspicious Transaction Reports Received for the period 
from 1 February 2003 until 31 March 2011, Michell (2011:6) 
Suspicious Transaction Reports made to the Financial 
Intelligence Centre 
Financial 
Year 
No of 
STRs 
Accumulated 
Total 
Difference % 
Increase 
or 
Decrease 
2002/03 991 991 - - 
72 
 
Financial 
Year 
No of 
STRs 
Accumulated 
Total 
Difference % 
Increase 
or 
Decrease 
2003/04 7 480 8 471 
6489 654.79% 
2004/05 15 757 24 228 
8277 110.66% 
2005/06 19 793 44 021 
4036 25.61% 
2006/07 21 466 65 487 
1673 8.45% 
2007/08 24 580 90 067 
3114 14.51% 
2008/09 22 762 112 829 
-1818 -7.40% 
2009/10 29 411 142 240 
6649 29.21% 
2010/11 36 990 179 230 
7579 25.77% 
Based on the researcher‟s experience at the Financial Intelligence Centre, the 
figures contained in Table 3.2 can be interpreted as follows:  
It is evident that there has been an annual increase in the amount of reports as 
received by the Centre. The two exceptional differences were the 654.79% increase 
from the 2002/03 to the 2003/04 financial year and the -7.40% decrease from the 
2007/08 to the 2008/09 financial year. One should keep in mind that the Centre 
only became operational and started receiving reports during February 2003, and 
that the 2002/03 financial year ended on 31 March 2003. Therefore, the amount of 
reports as received by the Centre for the 2002/03 financial year constituted only 2 
months in practice and contributed to what seems to be a huge increase in reports, 
whilst the monthly average amount of reports as received, remained constant (495 
for the 2002/03 financial year and 623 for the 2003/04 financial year). 
The researcher also supports the view of Michell (2010:28) that the Centre has 
improved its relationship with law enforcement agencies through increased 
interaction based on referrals and requests. Geldenhuys (2009:35) supports this 
argument in the article, “Organised Crime, the role of the Financial Intelligence 
Centre in Organised Crime”. 
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The Centre referred 331 intelligence reports dealing with suspected proceeds of 
crime, money laundering, and terror financing to law enforcement agencies during 
the 2009/10 financial year, and also responded to 393 requests for information from 
local as well as international law enforcement and security agencies (Michell, 
2010:31). The FIC, as well as the user community, would obviously like to see an 
increase in the number of referrals, which requires an improvement of the quality of 
reports that are filed as well as an increase in the capacity of the FIC to analyse and 
process these reports (De Koker, 2007: Com 5-10).  
The researcher further supports this author‟s opinion that, despite the relatively 
small number of referrals made, there were encouraging signs that these referrals 
were providing support to law enforcement agencies. It was indicated that by mid-
2005, the Asset Forfeiture Unit had frozen assets worth close on R100 million 
based on the strength of referrals received from the FIC (De Koker, 2007: Com 5-
10).  
3.6.5 Administration and Support Services Department 
According to the researcher, all the support services such as the Information and 
Communications Technology Unit, Procurement, Finance, and Human Resources 
divisions make up this department. These services are essential for the day-to-day 
functioning of the Centre and, therefore, deliver a required function.  
3.7 International and regional organisations 
Several international organisations are responsible for setting standards for financial 
intelligence units globally. The researcher will provide some background 
information about three of these organisations, namely, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and the Eastern and 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).  
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Can you name any 
international organisation that deals with anti-money laundering measures?” 
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Twenty-eight (28) participants could not name any international organisation. Two 
(2) of the thirty (30) participants were able to name the following organisations: 
“FATF”, and “ESAAMLG” and “Egmont”. The researcher, therefore, concluded 
that the responses to this question further confirmed that the participants have 
limited exposure to the Centre and its functions and that they are not aware of the 
existing co-operation between the Centre and its international counterparts.   
3.7.1 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The researcher can share, from personal experience, that the FATF is an inter-
governmental body that sets international standards, developing and promoting 
policies to combat money laundering and terror financing. It currently consists of 
over 30 countries. South Africa became a member of the FATF, and the first 
member country from Africa, during 2003. Over 180 jurisdictions have joined the 
FATF or an FATF-style regional body (such as ESAAMLG; refer to paragraph 
3.6.3). The FATF furthermore assesses and monitors compliance with its standards 
and conducts typology studies of money laundering and terror financing trends, 
methods and techniques (Deitz & Buttle, 2008:10). 
3.7.1.1 The FATF Recommendations 
The collective recommendations (40 Recommendations plus 9 Special 
Recommendations) provide a complete set of counter-measures against money 
laundering, covering the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial 
system and the regulation thereof, and international co-operation (Deitz & Buttle, 
2008:11-15 and Financial Action Task Force, 2011:1). 
Initially developed in 1990, the first revision of the 40 Recommendations took 
place in 1996 to take changes in money laundering trends into account and to 
anticipate potential future threats. More recently (2003), the FATF has completed a 
thorough review and update of the 40 Recommendations. The FATF has also 
elaborated on various Interpretative Notes, which they designed to clarify the 
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application of specific recommendations and to provide additional guidance (Deitz 
& Buttle, 2008:11-15). 
Money laundering methods and techniques change in response to developing 
counter-measures. In recent years, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has 
noted increasingly sophisticated combinations of techniques, such as the increased 
use of legal persons (trusts and companies) to disguise the true ownership and 
control of illegal proceeds, and an increased use of professionals to launder money. 
The revised 40 Recommendations do not only apply to money laundering, but also 
to terrorist financing; when combined with the 9 Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing, it provides an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent 
framework of measures for combating money laundering and terror financing. The 
FATF recognises that countries have diverse legal and financial systems and that 
not all countries can, therefore, implement similar measures to achieve the common 
objective, especially when referring to matters of detail.  
The 40 Recommendations plus 9 Special Recommendations, therefore, set 
minimum standards for countries it requires to take action to implement the detail 
according to their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks. These 
recommendations cover all the measures that national systems should have in place 
within their criminal justice and regulatory systems; the preventive measures to be 
taken by financial institutions and certain other businesses and professions; and 
international co-operation (Financial Action Task Force, 2011:3-4). 
The need for the monitoring and evaluation of systems of countries according to 
these international standards is a key element in the fight against money laundering 
and terror financing. The mutual evaluations that are conducted by the FATF and 
FATF-style regional bodies, as well as the assessments that are conducted by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, are vital mechanisms for 
ensuring that the FATF-recommendations are effectively implemented by all 
countries (Financial Action Task Force, 2011:4). 
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3.7.2 The Egmont Group 
On international level, the Centre also became a member of the Egmont Group of 
Financial Intelligence Units during 2003. The Egmont Group had 104 member 
countries in 2006 (Michell, 2006:29), and currently consists of 169 member 
countries (Egmont, 2011:1). 
The main purpose of the Egmont Group is to facilitate and enable the sharing of 
information and intelligence among the member financial intelligence units across 
the world (Michell, 2006:5). 
 
Figure 3.2 Structure of the Egmont Group, according to Egmont 
(2011:1) 
The Egmont Group organises regular working group and plenary meetings. The 
working groups in which South Africa has participated over the years include the 
outreach, training information technology, legal and operational working groups. 
The working group and plenary meetings were held in Oranjestad, Aruba, from 14-
17 March 2011, and from 11-15 July 2011, in Yerevan, Armenia (Egmont, 2011:1). 
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3.7.2.1 The Goal of the Egmont Group 
 
According to Egmont (2011:1), and based on the researcher‟s experience, the goal 
of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum for financial intelligence units around 
the globe to improve co-operation in the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. It also encourages all members to implement domestic 
programmes in these fields.  
 
This support includes: 
 Expanding and arranging international co-operation in the mutual 
exchange of information; 
 Increasing the effectiveness of financial intelligence units by offering 
training and promoting personnel exchanges to improve the expertise 
and capabilities of staff employed by financial intelligence units; 
 Developing better and secure communication among financial 
intelligence units through the application of technology, such as the 
Egmont Secure Web (ESW); 
 Promoting increased co-ordination and support among the operational 
divisions of member Units; 
 Promoting the operational autonomy of financial intelligence units; and 
 Promoting the establishment of financial intelligence units in 
conjunction with authorities that have an AML/CFT programme in 
place, or in areas with a programme in the early stages of development. 
 
3.7.3  Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) 
The Financial Action Task Force has several regional bodies, known as 
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), which are important in the 
promotion and implementation of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorist Financing standards within their respective regions (Zagaris, 
2010:64).  
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According to Zagaris (2010:64), the following five FSRBs are in operation:  
 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 
 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) 
 The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL)  
 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG) 
 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South 
America (GAFISUD) 
South Africa also forms part of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), which is a FATF-style regional body that was 
established in 1999 (Michell, 2006:28). It currently consists of 15 member countries 
in the region, namely: the Republics of Botswana, Comoros, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe and the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland (ESAAMLG, 
2011:1). 
3.8 Different types of financial intelligence units 
According to Gleason and Gottselig (2004:9-17), the following different types of 
financial intelligence units can be found internationally:  
 Administrative-type 
 Law-Enforcement-type 
 Judicial or prosecutorial-type 
 Hybrid 
The researcher can, from experience as an employee of the South African Financial 
Intelligence Centre, confirm that the Centre is moving from an Administrative-type 
towards a more Hybrid unit.   
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3.9 Summary 
From the above discussions, it has become clear that the investigation of money 
laundering related offences, by utilising the intelligence obtained from the Financial 
Intelligence Centre, are in line with the objectives of forensic investigation.  A 
money laundering investigation makes use of forensic methods to gather evidence, 
trace assets obtained by the culprits, and identify and arrest the perpetrator/s. The 
reader has been introduced to the structure, overview (the duties of the departments) 
and some achievements of the Financial Intelligence Centre since its inception 
(2003) until 2010.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that the obtaining of intelligence from the Financial 
Intelligence Centre during money laundering and other investigations serves the 
purpose of gathering intelligence, which the investigating officer should later 
transform into evidence. 
The following chapter will explain how a person can obtain intelligence from the 
Centre.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE 
CENTRE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is crucial that investigators should not only be informed about what they can 
obtain from institutions outside the South African Police Service and other 
competent authorities, but also how to obtain this information via the correct 
channels for effective application of this information in their investigations.  
 
It is of vital importance for an investigator to obtain intelligence for investigative 
purposes (Bedi, 2004:187-211 and Gottschalk, 2010:125). The researcher, 
furthermore, agrees with these authors that it is even more important that the 
investigators should know how to use the obtained intelligence as part of their 
investigations. 
 
The researcher will introduce the reader to the methods of obtaining intelligence 
from the Centre as well as the different types of intelligence products that the 
relevant investigators could obtain from the Centre. The researcher will focus on 
specific sections of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), and the 
subsequent Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act, (Act 11 of 2008); 
namely Sections 27, 34, 35 and 40 of the Act, as these sections are frequently used 
by the Centre in obtaining the different types of intelligence to provide to law 
enforcement agencies for use during their investigations, which are mostly of a 
financial nature.  
 
4.2 Establishing if a person or entity is a client 
 
The researcher can report, from experience as an employee of the Centre, that  
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Section 27 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), refers to the 
authority of the Centre, or an authorised representative of the Centre, to obtain 
information regarding clients or persons acting on behalf of clients from relevant 
accountable institutions. The relevant accountable institution has to advise the 
Centre, within a reasonable agreed upon time, whether a specified person or entity 
is, or has been a client of that institution; either directly or indirectly. This means 
that even if such a person or entity is acting or has acted on behalf of a client of that 
institution, or a client of the institution is acting or has acted on behalf of a specified 
person or entity, this must be reported to the Centre upon request in terms of this 
section of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), (Muller, Kälin & 
Goldsworth, 2007:793).     
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Do you know what a 
request is in terms of Section 27 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act?” Only 
seven (7) of the participants knew that this is a request that is sent to accountable 
institutions in order to establish whether a specified person or entity is, or has been, 
a client of that institution; either directly or indirectly. Some of the seven (7) 
answered as follows: “It is when the Centre establishes if a person is a client of a 
bank, casino or insurance company”, or “When the FIC confirms if a person or 
company banks at a certain bank”. Three (3) of the seven (7) participants 
specifically said: “The FIC asks banks if a person or company is their client”, “It is 
when the FIC helps to confirm to which banks we can send our Section 205 
Subpoenas” and “The FIC requests banks, brokers, insurance agencies and casinos 
if a specific person is their client”. These seven (7) participants were subsequently 
asked: “If yes, do you specify that the Centre should submit a Section 27 requests to 
accountable institutions, when you submit a request to the Centre?” Only four (4) of 
the seven (7) participants indicated that they did specify that they requested the 
Centre on previous occasions to establish, in terms of Section 27, whether a 
specified person or entity is, or has been, a client of that institution. The other three 
(3) participants did not specify the requirement, that requests in terms of Section 27 
should be submitted to accountable institutions, on their requests to the FIC.  
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It is evident to the researcher that most of the participants do not have a lot of 
exposure to the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001). The effect of 
this is that the Centre, as a source of information, may not be optimally utilised. The 
researcher can, from personal experience at the Centre, further report that this 
section of the Act is utilised regularly to establish if certain individuals or legal 
entities are, have been, or are acting on behalf of clients of specific banks, estate 
agents, casinos, financial service providers and insurance companies in South 
Africa. The analysts provide the obtained information to the investigating officers 
to guide them to which organisations they can direct their subpoenas in terms of 
Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977). 
 
4.3 Issuing an Intervention on an Account  
 
The researcher can report, from personal experience as an employee of the Centre, 
that Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), refers to 
the authority of the Centre to issue an instruction to freeze a specified account or 
accounts for a period of five (5) working days. This section does not apply to the 
carrying out of a transaction to which the rules of an exchange apply (Muller, Kälin 
& Goldsworth, 2007:793). 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Do you know what 
an intervention is in terms of Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
is?” Only six (6) of the participants knew that this is an instruction to freeze a 
specified account or accounts for a period of five (5) working days. The remaining 
twenty-four (24) participants either gave no answer or indicated that they were not 
sure. The participants were further asked: “How many requests for intervention 
have you submitted to the Centre before, if any?” Three (3) participants indicated 
that they have submitted requests for interventions before. One (1) of the three (3) 
participants previously submitted one request for an intervention, and two (2) of the 
three (3) participants submitted more than one request. These answers support the 
researcher‟s opinion that the majority of the participants were unaware of the 
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powers of the Centre to intervene on an account when suspecting that the proceeds 
of crime were deposited into that account.  
 
The researcher can furthermore report that the Centre works closely with the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority in order to obtain preservation 
and/or confiscation orders in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 
of 1998 (POCA), in the majority of cases where an intervention order in terms of 
Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), has been 
issued.  
 
4.4 Issuing a Monitoring Order 
 
The researcher has personally experienced that a designated judge can, on receipt of 
a written application from the Centre in terms of Section 35 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), order an accountable institution to report 
to the Centre on all transactions concluded by a specified person or account. The 
order will be granted if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that funds 
transferred to, or received by the accountable institution, are the proceeds of 
unlawful activities, or that the account has been or is being used to launder money. 
Such an order lapses after 3 months, but may be extended at the discretion of the 
judge, if the reasonable grounds for the suspicion still exist, or the judge deems that 
the interests of justice will be best served by continued monitoring (Muller, Kälin & 
Goldsworth, 2007:793). 
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “Do you know what a 
Monitoring Order is in terms of Section 35 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
is?” Six (6) of the thirty (30) participants answered that they knew what it is. They 
were further asked: “How many requests for Monitoring Orders have you submitted 
to the Centre, if any?” One (1) participant indicated submitting one request for a 
monitoring order previously. These answers, furthermore, support the researcher‟s 
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view that a lack of awareness existed among the participants, at the time of the 
interview, regarding the powers of the Centre to perform monitoring of accounts. 
 
The researcher can share, from personal experience, that Section 35 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), has not been utilised optimally during the 
existence of the Centre; the reasons for this under-utilisation are unknown to the 
researcher. The hope exists that, with the growing awareness about the existence of 
the Centre and its powers, Section 35 would be utilised more effectively in future.  
 
4.5 Access to information in the Centre‟s possession 
  
It is the researcher‟s experience that Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, (Act 38 of 2001), contains the main provisions that regulate access to the 
information that is held by the Centre.  This section makes provision that the Centre 
may supply investigating authorities, SARS and the Intelligence Services with 
information - on request, or at the initiative of the Centre. It may provide 
information to foreign entities performing functions similar to its own, pursuant to a 
formal, written agreement between the Centre and such an entity. The Centre may 
furthermore decide to provide information to accountable or reporting institutions 
or persons regarding steps taken by its analysts in connection with transactions that 
these parties reported to the Centre, unless it would be deemed inappropriate to 
disclose such information. Information may also be supplied to a supervisory body 
to enable it to exercise its powers and perform its functions in relation to an 
accountable institution. In addition, the Centre may supply information in terms of a 
court order, or in terms of other national legislation (De Koker, 2007: Com 5-8).  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked: “How do you use the 
intelligence obtained from the FIC?” Only three (3) participants indicated that they 
used it for intelligence-profiling and value-adding purposes regarding their existing 
intelligence. Twenty-seven (27) of the participants have never obtained any 
intelligence from the Centre. The researcher, therefore, concluded that it is clear 
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from the twenty-seven (27) responses that the majority of participants were not 
aware, at the time of the interview, of the kinds of intelligence that are obtainable 
from the Centre.  
   
The researcher can report that requests for information are directed to the Centre‟s 
Monitoring and Analysis Department by authorised officers (on behalf of 
requestors) in terms of Section 40 (a)(i) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
(Act 38 of 2001). These requests are considered for action on the grounds of its 
contents. The requests that can be answered, will subsequently be operationalised; 
otherwise, the requestor will be informed (via the relevant authorised officer) that 
the specific details that are contained in his or her request fall outside the mandate 
of the Centre, and that it will, unfortunately, not be able to respond to the request.  
 
During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were asked the following three 
questions in relation to authorised officers: “Do you know what an authorised 
officer in terms of Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act is?” and  
“Are you an authorised officer?” and lastly: “Have you submitted any requests for 
information to the FIC before?” Eleven (11) participants indicated that they knew 
what an authorised officer is and nineteen (19) indicated that they did not know. 
Only five (5) of the participants indicated that they act as authorised officers for 
their organisations. Thirteen (13) participants have submitted requests for 
information to the Centre before and seventeen (17) have not submitted any. The 
responses by the participants indicated that the majority of them were unaware 
about the term “authorised officer” at the time of the interview. 
 
The Centre also initiates the referral of information it deems appropriate for further 
investigation to the relevant investigative authorities in terms of Section 40 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), (refer to Chapter 3, paragraph 
3.5.4.1 Monitoring and Analysis Achievements, for a discussion on some details 
about the number of referrals). 
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During the interviews, the thirty (30) participants were finally asked: “Do you have 
any suggestions to improve the performance of the Centre?” They provided the 
following suggestions regarding the improvement of the Centre‟s performance 
(some provided more than one suggestion): 
 “More co-operation required; require operational contact in order to 
add the financial investigation ability to investigations.” 
 “Create more awareness of what the Centre can do for 
investigators.” 
 “Problem with the reporting structure, regarding the reporting to 
FIC. Need to make it more approachable.” 
 “Not accessible enough.” 
 “Market them better, interact with SARS at operational level on a 
regular basis.” 
 “Make it easier to communicate with the Centre. Red tape prevents 
interaction at an operational level.” 
 “Communication and interaction should be improved.” 
 “More interaction on lower levels is required.” 
 “All law enforcement agencies should be working closer together, 
sharing information in task teams.” 
 “The FIC should have direct access to live accounting institution 
databases. This will enable FIC to address requests effectively and 
on time as they have access to live databases.” 
 “Submitted requests in September - no feedback received as yet. 
Improve turnaround times regarding requests submitted.” 
 “Weekly feedback and interaction between requestors and analysts 
from the FIC.” 
 “Interaction face to face. Workshops, inform of changes and latest 
trends.” 
 “Turnaround times for requests should be improved, analysts should 
call the recipients and tell them what the delays are, and 
communication should be improved in order to increase interaction.” 
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 “All the relevant raw data, moneygrams, partial information should 
be sent with responses to SAPS. One or two levels more analysis 
should be added. Progress reports should be given to the 
investigating officer and the analyst/s should have direct access to 
the requestor.” 
 “Immediately support all reports with the necessary affidavits so that 
the information and facts are court prepared. On some Suspicious 
Transaction Reports the analysts need to perform preliminary 
investigations to eliminate suspicion before referral.” 
 “One or more constructed reports send to eliminate unnecessary big 
investigations that waste time.” 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that these suggestions could initiate valuable 
contributions to improve the overall performance of the Centre.  
 
4.6 Summary 
 
The sections of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), that are 
most frequently utilised to obtain intelligence from accountable institutions have 
been discussed in this chapter.  
 
Furthermore, the process for the identification of clients by an accountable 
institution has been discussed and the researcher referred to the intervention on and 
monitoring of accounts. Lastly, an overview of Section 40, which governs the 
controls over access to information obtained and held by the Centre, has been 
presented.  
 
The next chapter will reflect the findings and recommendations of this research 
study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The research resulted from the researcher‟s observation that the need exists to 
improve awareness among investigators about the existence of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre in general, and more specifically, the process of obtaining 
intelligence from the Centre as well as the different types of intelligence products 
that are available from the Centre.  
The Financial Intelligence Centre has an important role to play in the fight against 
crime. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that all the role players in the law 
enforcement field possess enough knowledge about the existence of the Centre as 
well as its mandate and limitations.   
The aims of the research were to determine what financial investigations entail, 
what the Financial Intelligence Centre is, and to empower and educate investigators 
regarding obtaining intelligence from the Centre. These aims enabled the researcher 
to make recommendations that may contribute to the improvement of the overall 
standard of financial investigations in South Africa. 
The researcher gathered information from literature written by international and 
domestic authors and conducted interviews with fifteen (15) investigating officers 
and analysts from the South African Police Service as well as fifteen (15) 
investigating officers and analysts from the South African Revenue Service in an 
attempt to address the following research questions:  
o What do financial investigations entail? 
o What is the Financial Intelligence Centre? 
o How can intelligence be obtained from the Centre? 
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The following findings and recommendations were derived from the research aims 
and questions in order to ensure validity of the research.  
5.2 Findings 
The following findings were made in relation to each of the research questions: 
5.2.1 Research Question One: What do financial investigations entail? 
 The research has revealed that a “financial investigation” is the collecting, 
controlling, complementing, processing and analysing of financial and/or 
related data on behalf of law enforcement. 
 
 During a financial investigation, the investigators sift through financial 
information, for example, bank accounts in order to identify the flow of 
money to identify not only the possible perpetrators, but also possible 
proceeds of crime. 
 
 The core of a financial investigation is an analytic and systematic approach 
to all aspects of criminal information that relate to the financial aspects of 
crime. 
 
 Most of the participants were familiar with what a financial investigation is; 
only a few of them were not able to describe the term “financial 
investigation”. 
 
 It became evident that financial crime refers to diverse activities that cannot 
be included under a standardised category, because of factors that make an 
accurate definition elusive, namely, the newness of the field, the overlap of 
criminal and statutory law, and differences among legal systems. 
 
 A financial investigation can also form part of a forensic investigation, 
which is described as a scientific approach to criminal investigation and 
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aimed at ascertaining the facts that will lead to the reconstruction of a crime 
or crime scene.  
 
 The main focus of a financial investigation is the gathering of documentary 
evidence, for example, accounts and documents (as also pointed out by the 
participants). However, financial evidence can also be used to build cases 
against persons suspected of crimes such as kidnapping, murder and arson. 
 
 The participants were creative in their description of the investigation 
phases, mentioning the following phases: “first information of crime”, 
“gathering of information”, “investigation”, “analyses”, “dissemination”, 
“planning and execution”, “exploration”, “confirmation”, “development of 
understanding” and “prosecution”. 
 
 It was confirmed that the investigation process with regard to white collar 
crime is also applicable to a financial investigation. The process requires the 
following five important elements: 1) the investigation must have specific 
intent and limited objectives, 2) the investigation should be tailored to the 
specific white collar crime, because each white collar crime has its own 
characteristics, 3) all relevant, documented evidence should be properly 
collected and handled, 4) the essential elements of proof should be 
established, and 5) the investigating officer should strive to proof the crime 
despite the goal. 
 
 During a financial investigation, when intelligence is obtained from the 
Financial Intelligence Centre, adherence to the intelligence cycle is of 
utmost importance to improve the standard of the intelligence products 
(information) prepared by the Analysts for the investigators. This 
intelligence cycle consists of the following phases: direction or collection, 
evaluation and collation, analysis, dissemination, feedback, and review.  
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 It also became evident that tactical intelligence has an important role to play 
in financial investigations, because it is information that is directly related to 
some present activity, must be made available in a timely fashion to 
operational personnel, should directly support an immediate law 
enforcement objective, and is primarily used by operational officers such as 
investigators. This type of tactical intelligence relating to an individual or 
entity, for example, latest physical address, telephone number, bank account 
details, identity documents and proof of address, can be obtained from the 
Centre. 
 
 Strategic intelligence is also of importance in financial investigations and 
can be utilised to make projections and/or predictions about future law 
enforcement needs, and to compile threat assessment documents in order to 
plan according to possible threats posed by specific criminal groupings, 
taking into account other factors, such as sociological and economic factors 
that might contribute to a rise in crime statistics. In future, the Centre can 
play a more prominent role in providing strategic intelligence to law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
 Almost every crime might have some kind of financial motivation. The 
following are examples of financial crimes: money laundering, fraud, 
corruption, tax evasion, bribery, embezzlement, larceny, forgery, 
counterfeiting, blackmail, extortion, kickbacks, racketeering and insider 
trading.  
 
 Money laundering poses a huge challenge to financial investigators. Money 
laundering in the sub-region of Southern Africa occurs on a significant 
scale; a total of US$ 22 billion was laundered through the financial systems 
of Southern Africa in 1998. 
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 Money laundering consists of three stages, placement (the introduction of 
illicit funds into the financial cycle), layering (the moving and transferring 
of funds in order to disguise the origins and true ownership of the money) 
and integration (the process of using apparently legitimate transactions to 
disguise the illicit proceeds, allowing the laundered funds to be disbursed 
back to the criminal).  
 
 An important aspect of financial investigations is the tracking, freezing and 
confiscation of assets that are linked to a known criminal or his or her 
associates. The Centre provides information and support to financial 
investigators in this regard. 
 
5.2.2 Research Question Two: What is the Financial Intelligence Centre? 
 
 It was determined that the Financial Intelligence Centre, also known as “The 
Centre” or “FIC”, has been established on 31 January 2002, and commenced 
with the receiving of Section 29 reports from February 2003. It managed to 
play a leading role in the implementation of money laundering and terror 
financing laws. 
 
 The research has revealed that the objectives for the existence of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre are the following: assisting in the 
identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities; combating of organised 
crime, money laundering activities and terror financing activities; sharing of 
collected information with investigative authorities, the South African 
Revenue Services and the Intelligence Services to facilitate the 
administration and enforcement of the laws of South Africa; exchanging 
information with international counterparts (financial intelligence units) 
regarding money laundering activities and other related offences; 
monitoring and providing guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory 
bodies and other persons regarding: the performance of their duties, their 
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compliance with the provisions of the Act, and retaining all information 
(obtained and received pursuant to compliance with the provisions of the 
Act). 
 
 The research has shown that there is a limited amount of knowledge among 
investigators about the capabilities of the Centre.  
 
 It was determined that the values of the Centre are based on the principle of 
Ubuntu (i.e., people demonstrating integrity in all their actions and who are 
open and available to others, affirming others, not feeling threatened that 
others are able and good, for they have a proper self-assurance that comes 
from knowing that they belong in a greater whole and are diminished when 
others are humiliated or diminished, or when others are tortured or 
oppressed). The members of the Centre, therefore, display pride and 
discipline in their work, strive for excellence and professionalism, optimise 
relationships with stakeholders and partners, and ensure the security of 
organisational assets and information. 
 
 It was revealed that the Compliance and Prevention Department has been 
involved in compliance reviews and several other stakeholder engagements. 
Regular meetings were held where feedback was obtained from the different 
industries to address some of the practical challenges. 
 
 It is evident that the Monitoring and Analysis Department plays an 
important role in supporting law enforcement agencies to combat complex 
financial and organised crimes. The unit consists of a number of highly 
skilled analysts who are experts in interrogating the Centre‟s databases and 
preparing intelligence assessments detailing the financial behaviour of 
persons, highlighting suspicious and or potential criminal activity. 
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 The Administration and Support Services Department of the Centre consists 
of services such as information technology, procurement, finance and 
human resources. These services are essential for the day-to-day functioning 
of the Centre. 
 
 It was revealed that the following international and regional organisations 
deal with anti-money laundering and terror financing measures: the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Egmont Group, and the Eastern 
and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group.  
 
 The research has shown that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an 
international body, which sets international standards, and developing and 
promoting policies to combat money laundering and terror financing. South 
Africa became a member, and the first member country from Africa, during 
2003. 
 
 It was revealed that the Financial Action Task Force has several regional 
bodies that are known as FATF-Style Regional Bodies, which are important 
in the promotion and implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing standards within its respective regions. The regional 
bodies are the following: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), The Committee of 
Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the 
Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD). 
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5.2.3 Research Question Three: How can intelligence be obtained from the 
Centre? 
 
 It has become evident that it is of vital importance that investigators know 
how to obtain intelligence for their investigations from the Centre.  
 
 It was determined that Section 27 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
(Act 38 of 2001), refers to the authority of the Centre to obtain information 
regarding clients from relevant accountable institutions. 
 
 The research has shown that the relevant accountable institution has to 
advise the Centre, within a reasonable agreed upon time, whether a specified 
person or entity is, or has been a client of that institution; directly or 
indirectly. 
 
 It became evident that Section 27 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 
(Act 38 of 2001), is utilised regularly to establish if certain individuals or 
legal entities are, have been, or are acting on behalf of clients of specific 
banks, estate agents, casinos, financial service providers and insurance 
companies in South Africa. 
 
 The research has revealed that Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), refers to the authority of the Centre to issue an 
instruction to freeze a specified account or accounts for a period of five (5) 
working days.  
 
 The research has revealed that a designated judge can, on receipt of a 
written application from the Centre in terms of Section 35 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), order an accountable institution to 
report to the Centre on all transactions concluded by a specified person or 
account. An order will be granted if there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
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that funds transferred to, or received by the accountable institution are the 
proceeds of unlawful activities, or that the account has been, or is being 
used to launder money. 
 
 It was revealed that access to information in the Centre‟s possession is 
regulated by Section 40 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 
2001).  This section makes provision for investigating authorities, SARS 
and intelligence services to be provided with information regarding 
suspicious transactions, on request or at the initiative of the Centre.   
 
 Requests for information are directed to the Centre‟s Monitoring and 
Analysis Department by authorised officers (on behalf of requestors) in 
terms of Section 40 (a)(i) of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 
of 2001).  
 
 The research has revealed shortcomings and problems in the following 
specific areas:  
 Co-operation and operational contact between the Centre and clients; 
 Awareness on what the Centre can offer the investigators; 
 The reporting structure of the Centre (not approachable enough); 
 Accessibility of the Centre; 
 Communication and interaction with the Centre (red tape prevents 
interaction at an operational level); 
 Working relationship with law enforcement agencies (not working 
together close enough and information sharing in task teams is not 
taking place); 
 Promotion of the Centre; 
 The Centre‟s access to live databases at accounting institutions (no 
direct access to these databases; this affects the Centre‟s ability to 
address requests effectively); 
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 The Centre response to submitted reports;  
 The Centre‟s manpower; 
 Face-to-face interaction with the Centre; 
 Training regarding what the Centre offers; 
 Progress reports from the Centre to investigating officers; 
 Direct access between investigators and analysts; 
 The necessary affidavits that are required to accompany the reports 
from the Centre in order for the evidence to be court prepared. 
5.3 Recommendations  
Following the above research findings, the researcher recommends that the Centre: 
  Includes the following aspects in its training curricula: comprehensive 
detail regarding white collar crime, the phases of the investigation process, 
the crimes that fall in the category of financial crimes, distinguishing 
between criminal and financial investigations, the different investigation 
techniques, and the steps of the intelligence cycle; 
 
 Emphasises  the value of investigators using software that was designed for 
analysts (e.g., Analyst‟s Notebook and iBase), especially when the 
investigators conduct financial investigations; 
 
 Improves awareness about the existence of international bodies such as 
FATF, the Egmont Group and ESAAMLG by means of distribution of 
pamphlets about these organisations or by providing information about the 
websites of these organisations;  
 
 Enhances awareness about the existence of the Centre and the types of 
intelligence products that a person could obtain from the Centre; this, in 
turn, might lead to more interaction between the Centre and its clients; 
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 Makes an effort to increase co-operation and operational contact between 
the Centre and its clients; 
 
 Improves awareness regarding what the Centre can offer the investigators; 
 
 Attempts to improve its turnaround times when responding to requests;  
 
 Conducts an aggressive recruitment drive in order to address the shortage of 
manpower; 
 
 Attempts to increase the number of face-to-face interaction sessions with its 
clients;  
 
 Implements the practice of sending out progress reports to the investigating 
officers in order to keep them informed about progress in specific matters; 
and  
 
 Creates a platform for direct access between investigators and analysts. 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
The researcher could address all the research questions adequately by means of the 
methodology applied during this research. It is of utmost importance that 
investigators should continually enhance their investigative skills and use the best, 
most effective and relevant methods and techniques available for the improvement 
of the investigation of crime. It is of utmost importance that investigators should 
continually enhance their investigative skills and use the best, most effective and 
relevant methods and techniques available for the improvement of the investigation 
of crime.  
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The research findings emphasised a general lack of awareness about the Financial 
Intelligence Centre and its functions, even though the majority of participants had a 
number of years of experience in law enforcement and investigations. In addition, 
the research proved that the majority of the participants lacked knowledge about the 
definition/specification of white collar crime, differences between financial and 
criminal investigations, phases of the investigation process, steps of the intelligence 
cycle, date of establishment of the Centre, objectives for the existence of the Centre, 
stages of money laundering, and international organisations dealing with anti-
money laundering measures.  
 
The researcher, therefore, recommends that the Centre embarks on a number of 
active awareness campaigns in an effort to enhance knowledge about the existence 
of the Centre, and ways in which it could assist investigators of financial crime.  
Further research into South African trends in money laundering is also 
recommended; more specifically in the following four (4) areas to improve 
investigations of a financial nature (especially those similar to Ponzi schemes): 1) 
Limitations in terms of information that a person could obtain by utilising Section 
27 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001); 2) Measures that can 
be implemented to increase the number of requests submitted to the Centre by law 
enforcement agencies; 3) Methods of improving the utilisation of Section 34 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), (i.e., to increase the number of 
intervention or freezing orders); and 4) Ways in which the utilisation of Section 35 
of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, (Act 38 of 2001), can be improved (i.e., to 
increase the number of monitoring orders). 
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ANNEXURE A 
1. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
Section 1:  Background Information/ Historical information 
 
 
Gender: 
Male Female 
 
Age group: 
18-22      23-27     28-32   33-37    38-42    43-47     48-54 55+ 
 
Period in Law Enforcement (years): 
Less than 1 1-3 4-6 7-10 11+ 
  
1.1 Are you a financial investigator? Y/N 
 
1.2 If yes, how long have you been investigating financial crimes? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
1.3 Have you completed the financial investigator’s course presented by   
the FIC? Y/N 
 
1.4 Have you completed any other financial investigation/ money 
laundering or Commercial Crime courses? Y/N 
If yes, please list it. 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
1.5 Do you have analysis experience? Y/N 
 
1.6 If yes, for how long? ______________________________________ 
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Section 2:   Financial Investigations 
 
2.1      Can you explain what white collar crime is? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2.2      Can you explain what a financial investigation is? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2.3      Can you explain briefly what the three phases of the investigation 
process consist of? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
2.3.1 Is there, in your opinion, a difference between a Financial    
     Investigation and a Criminal Investigation? Y/N 
 
2.4.1 If the answer to the previous question is “yes”, please explain briefly 
what the differences are? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2.5 Please explain what the use of intelligence in a financial investigation
 is? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
  
2.6 Can you name the different phases of the intelligence cycle? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2.7 Briefly explain the different stages of money laundering? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
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2.8 Do you utilise Analyst’s Notebook or similar software? Y/N   
 
2.8.1 If no, do you have access to an analyst who can assist you in 
compiling charts and reports (analysis products?) Y/N 
 
2.9 Can you read and understand an analysis chart? Y/N 
 
2.10 Do you know what the dotted and solid lines on a chart mean? Y/N 
 
2.10.1 If yes, can you explain what a dotted line on a chart means? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2.10.2 Explain briefly what a solid line on a chart means? 
_______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
2.11 According to your knowledge, name the different types of crimes that 
can be regarded as financial crimes? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
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Section 3:  The Financial Intelligence Centre 
 
3.1      What year was the Centre established?  
 
3.2      According to your knowledge, name the legislation that is relevant to  
 the existence of the Centre? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
3.3      What are the objectives for the existence of the Centre? 
 _______________________________________________________ 
 
3.3.1 Where is the FIC’s office? 
___________________________________ 
 
 
3.3.2 Can you name a few of the Departments in the FIC?   
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
3.4      Can you name any international organisation that deals with anti- 
 money laundering measures? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
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Section 4: Intelligence obtained from the Financial Intelligence 
Centre 
 
4.1 Do you know what an Authorised Officer in terms of Section 40 of the 
      Financial Intelligence Centre Act is? Y/N 
 
4.2.1 Are you an Authorised Officer? Y/N 
 
4.2.2 Have you submitted a request for information to the FIC before? Y/N 
 
4.3       Do you know what a request in terms of Section 27 of the Financial 
 Intelligence Centre Act is? Y/N 
 
4.3.1  If yes, do you specify that the Centre should submit a request in      
 terms of Section 27 to accountable institutions when you send a 
request to the Centre? Y/N 
 
4.4  Do you know what an intervention in terms of Section 34 of the    
   Financial Intelligence Centre Act is? Y/N 
 
4.4.1  How many requests for intervention have you submitted to the 
Centre, if any? 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
4.5 Do you know what a monitoring order in terms of Section 35 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act is? Y/N  
 
4.5.1 How many requests for monitoring orders have you submitted to the 
Centre, if any? 
_____________________________________________ 
 
4.6 How do you use the intelligence obtained from the FIC? 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
 
4.7 Do you have any suggestions to improve the performance of the 
Centre? 
 _______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________ 
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